

Extended version of paper discussed at Kingston Philosophy Café on Tuesday 12 July 2016

DEMOCRACY

Thomas Jefferson is claimed to have said: "A democracy is nothing more than mob rule, where fifty-one percent of the people may take away the rights of the other forty-nine." In the light of the EU Referendum, is this true? Does democracy inevitably imply ochlocracy (mob rule), what do we mean by 'democracy' anyway and is it in practice achievable only through some system of representative government?

There is no such thing as 'the people'. There are only *people*, variously *grouped*.

1. Abraham Lincoln characterised democracy as "government of the people, by the people, for the people".¹ But *the* people, conceived as some unitary being with a mind or will of its own, does not exist. There are just *people* varying widely in their characteristics, interests and beliefs. They do not live as isolated individuals but as members, willing or otherwise, of various *social groups* which confer rights and impose obligations upon them. Most relevant to our discussion are the territorial groupings of people comprising 'nation states' (e.g. the United Kingdom) and 'local states' (e.g. the Royal Borough of Kingston upon Thames). Also relevant are supra-national bodies (e.g. the EU) and religious, political, economic and other organisations that cross-cut national boundaries and compete for people's allegiance.

Social/political arrangements are the product of *collective intentionality*, reflect *competing interests* and often *lack coherence*.

2. Nation states, local states and supra-national bodies are, amongst many other *human organisations*, the product of *collective intentionality* and exist only in people's heads (although they may have physical expression in, for example, barriers to movement such as border fences). Collective intentionality should not be taken to imply consensus. Instead there are *competing* world views reflecting, amongst other things, different social and economic perspectives. At any time there will be a *predominant* institutional reality reflecting power relationships in society. Such reality, however, will not necessarily possess internal consistency or coherence. In the United States, for example, the democratic institutions founded upon the recognition of the 'self-evident' truth that 'all men are created equal' existed into the second half of the 19th century alongside the institution of slavery and into the second half of the 20th century alongside institutionalised racial segregation. 'Men' was interpreted literally, equal voting rights for women not being fully achieved until 1920. The struggle between competing perspectives means that institutional reality is in a constant state of flux. Observer-dependent attitudes are *constitutive* of institutional reality. By changing them we change that reality, for good or ill.

Systems of government, including democratic systems, are inherently *fragile*.

3. The observer-dependent nature of institutional reality makes it inherently *fragile*. Features (e.g. systems of government) that have endured for a long time may appear set in tablets of stone. Peacefully or otherwise, however, they can be overturned in a short space of time by shifts in underlying attitudes and beliefs. The philosopher John Searle² makes the point very clearly. "The collective assignment of status functions, and above all their continued recognition and acceptance [willing or unwilling] over long periods of time, can create and maintain a reality of governments, money, nation-states, ownership of private property, universities, political parties and a thousand other such institutions that can seem as epistemically objective as geology and as much a permanent part of our landscape as rock formations. But with the withdrawal of collective

¹ *Gettysburg Address* (1863)

² John Searle, *Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World*. 1999, Basic Books

acceptance, such institutions can collapse suddenly, as witness the amazing collapse of the Soviet empire in a matter of months, beginning in *annus mirabilis* 1989.” The direction of change can be negative as well as positive. Democratic systems are not immune to subversion, corruption and collapse (viz. the supplanting of Germany’s broadly democratic Weimar republic by a National Socialist regime that was initially voted into power and for many years enjoyed popular support).

Membership of some human groups, including nation states, is *involuntary*.

4. Any human organisation requires *some* system for making, implementing and, if necessary, *enforcing* choices (e.g. about rules of conduct and use of resources) with which its members are expected to comply. In the case of a *voluntary* organisation, members discontented with the system/choices can, as a last resort, resign. Membership of a nation state³, however, is *involuntary* (determined largely by accident of birth) and such 'resignation' is generally possible only by escaping to the jurisdiction of *another* such state.⁴ Involuntariness of membership accompanied by restrictions on freedom of physical/social mobility apply to other human arrangements including city states, feudalism, slavery and caste/class systems. The nature of both choice-making systems and of choices made will reflect the interests of those in whom power is concentrated i.e. political, social, economic, military and religious elites. General acceptance of the system, even by those it most disadvantages (e.g. serfs in feudal societies), might be obtained by propagating some ideological myth (e.g. 'the Natural Social Order' or 'the Divine Right of Kings'). As social/economic conditions change, new power elites may emerge (e.g. the commercial/industrial elites that replaced/joined the old landed aristocracies). How readily the system accommodates them may determine whether change is evolutionary or revolutionary.

Democratic systems are *more likely*, but not *guaranteed*, to serve most people's interests.

5. A key issue is the extent to which political systems can operate for the benefit of the many rather than the privileged few. This is not necessarily guaranteed by democratic systems where people have the right to vote every few years in general/local elections and, perhaps, in occasional referendums. A globalised world economy dominated by multi-national corporations and characterised by the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of a few might negate the ability of citizens to improve their lot through democratic processes. Perhaps democracies are tolerated only as long as they do not pursue radical policies that might threaten the vested interests of powerful elites. A more sanguine view is that, although such elites exist, they to an extent counterbalance one another, are not immutable and are constrained by the need for democratic legitimisation. The sociologist Karl Mannheim expresses such a view when he argues that: "... the actual shaping of policy is in the hands of elites; but this does not mean that the

³ Most nation states are products of the 20th century, decolonisation and end-of-war treaties. Their boundaries can be quite arbitrary (e.g. ruled lines on a map) and some may merge into larger, or break-up into smaller, states. They often contain a wide diversity of ethnic, cultural, religious, language and other groups. The sense of national identity amongst their citizens ('nation state' arguably being a misnomer) can vary widely (e.g. many UK citizens consider themselves as much 'English', 'Irish', 'Scottish' or 'Welsh' as 'British'). William Inge (erstwhile Dean of St Pauls and Professor of Divinity at Cambridge University) expressed the perhaps cynical view that "a nation is a society united by a delusion about its ancestry and by a common hatred of its neighbours".

⁴ In most nation states (but not *all*) people are free to live/work in any of their constituent 'local states' (e.g. In Kingston upon Thames rather than Guildford or in Texas rather than Alabama). The right to live/work in another *nation* state, however, generally requires a permit, a change of nationality or acquisition of dual nationality but can be conferred by reciprocal agreements (e.g. as between the UK and the Irish Republic) or by membership of a supra-national organisation such as the EU. Generally, a non-national resident of a country is subject to its laws without being able to vote in its elections (although citizens of the Irish Republic and of qualifying Commonwealth countries living in the UK can vote in its elections and were able to vote in the EU Referendum). An argument against a single world government, it might be noted, is that people who oppose it, and perhaps fall foul of it, have nowhere to go to escape its jurisdiction.

society is not democratic. For it is sufficient for democracy that the individual citizens, though prevented from taking a direct part in government all the time, have at least the *possibility* of making their aspirations felt at certain intervals ... Pareto is right in stressing that political power is always exercised by minorities (elites), and we may also accept Robert Michels' law of the trend towards oligarchic rule in party organisations. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to overestimate the stability of such elites in democratic societies, or their ability to wield power in arbitrary ways. In a democracy, the governed can always act to remove their leaders or to force them to take decisions in the interests of the many."⁵

Democracies are generally *representative* but *direct* forms of democracy are possible.

6. In practice, democracy generally means government *for* people by their elected representatives (*representative* democracy) rather than government *by* people (*direct* democracy). It is widely argued that population size, the complexity of issues and the need for their detailed discussion and debate renders direct democracy impossible. However, direct voting in referendums on *major issues of principle* (leaving the details to be sorted out by elected representatives) is clearly *possible* (although not necessarily *desirable*)⁶ and could be facilitated much more by the use of modern information technology. An issue with referendums is who chooses their subjects and sets the questions. Under the Swiss Federal Constitution, a petition that gathers at least 100,000 signatures over an 18 month period is subject to a referendum (generally 3-5 years later). The Swiss Parliament first debates the proposal and may decide to adopt it (although this rarely happens and most petitions go to a national referendum). Twelve referendums were held in 2014 on subjects including abortion, immigration, minimum wage, flat rate tax and health insurance.

Democracies may require more than simple majority approval for constitutional change.

7. Most countries, unlike the UK, have written constitutions. Many require major constitutional change to be approved by more than a simple majority of elected representatives (e.g. two-thirds) whereas in the UK a Parliamentary majority of just *one* can trigger such change. A similar requirement could be applied to referendums. Alternatively, their outcome could be determined by a simple majority of those voting as long as they represented a minimum proportion (perhaps 40%) of all *eligible* to vote (the rule that was applied to the 1979 Scottish Assembly referendum). Those voting 'leave' in the EU referendum comprised only 37% of the *electorate*.⁷

But any requirement for more than simple majority approval favours the *status quo*.

8. A problem with requiring constitutional/legislative change to be approved by anything more than a simple majority of elected representatives (or of citizens voting in referendums) is that it favours the *status quo*. In the United States of America, an amendment to the Constitution has to be proposed by a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress and ratified by the legislatures of

⁵ Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Culture*, 1956 (quoted in: T. B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society*, 1964)

⁶ With most issues the devil is in the detail. In contrast to Acts of Parliament, referendums are concerned only with *general* propositions, not detailed proposals. Hence the verdict of the EU referendum is simply that the UK must cease to be a member of the EU. It specifies *nothing* about the form that any alternative economic/political arrangement should take. Making radical and irrevocable decisions without *first* establishing their rationale, assessing their detailed implications and identifying how they are to be implemented, is a recipe for disappointment, if not disaster.

⁷ Under the Trade Union Act 2016, trade union ballots for industrial action are invalid unless at least 50% of members eligible to vote actually do so. If the same principle were applied to local authority elections the outcomes of most would be deemed invalid (turnouts in such elections, except when they coincide with general elections, averaging under 40%). In the case of 'important public services', a majority vote for industrial action does not count unless those voting in favour comprise at least 40% of *all eligible to vote*. Those who voted 'leave' in the EU referendum comprised only 37% of the electorate. Whilst industrial action might involve just a one-day strike, the result of the EU referendum will determine, for good or ill, the political and economic future of the UK for decades to come.

three-quarters of the states. The bar is thus set very high for changes to the Constitution and to the rights that it enshrines (e.g. the right conferred by the Second Amendment which reads: "A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed"). In the UK, a need for approval by more than a simple majority of MPs is contained within the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 under which general elections must be held at strict five-yearly intervals (starting in 2015). An election cannot be held earlier unless a) a motion for it is agreed by at least *two-thirds* of the whole House or without division or b) a motion of no confidence is passed and no alternative government is confirmed by the Commons within 14 days. Had it wished, Parliament could have set the bar even higher, perhaps requiring an 'early' election to be approved by at least *three-quarters* of the House. At any time, of course, a simple majority of MPs could *repeal* the Fixed-term Parliaments Act.

Constitutional provisions that hamper/prevent future change are problematic.

9. An intriguing question is the extent to which legislatures can/should restrict the ability of *future* legislatures to change the content of written constitutions or of individual laws. The United States Constitution (signed in 1787 and ratified in 1788) contains 7 Articles, the fifth of which specifies the required level of approval (see paragraph 8) for its amendment (including amendment of the 5th Article *itself*, thus raising the thorny issue of *self-reference*⁸). What if the 5th Article required amendments to be approved by *all* state legislatures (as was seriously considered when the Constitution was being drawn up) thereby rendering most, if not all, constitutional change impossible to achieve? Or if it stated that the Constitution was set in tablets of stone and could *never* be amended? Although the UK has no formal written constitution, a similar issue would arise if Parliament were to pass a law stipulating that no law, *including itself*, could be amended/repealed other than with the support of at least two-thirds, three-quarters, nine tenths or, perhaps, the *entirety* of MPs. In the UK, the accepted principle is that laws must be obeyed whilst they exist but can be changed at any time by a simple Parliamentary majority. To make legislative change more difficult, arguably, is to allow the past to bind the present. Nothing is sacrosanct, not even Magna Carta (used periodically and often spuriously over the centuries as a peg for various constitutional claims but concerned primarily with the rights, *vis-à-vis* the king, of the more privileged classes of early 13th century feudal England). By the same principle, the result of any referendum can be overturned at any time by a subsequent referendum.

In the UK, the *constitutional status of referendums* is unclear.

10. Twelve referendums (see Appendix 1) have been held in the UK since 1973. In the absence of a written constitution, their *status* is far from clear. The *convention* established over many years is that Parliament (subject to periodic re-election and the formality of Royal Assent) is *sovereign*. Referendums, arguably, are only *advisory*. On this basis, MPs are free to vote, if they wish, *against* any legislative change needed for EU withdrawal (involving the repeal of the 1972 European Communities Act which took the UK into the EEC in 1973).⁹ Apart from the narrowness of the overall referendum result and the fact that the 'leave' majority represented less than 40% of the electorate, an MP might seek to justify voting against the implementation of EU withdrawal on one or more of the following grounds.

- A majority of his/her *own constituents* voted 'remain' and the duty of an MP is to represent his/her own constituency.

⁸ A fictitious example of self-reference is Rule 6 of the Australian University of Woolamadoo's Philosophy Faculty (as portrayed in a 1970 *Monty Python's Flying Circus* sketch) which states "There is no Rule 6".

⁹ Depending upon how opposition MPs vote, it might take only a fairly small number of Conservative MPs to *abstain* from voting for the repeal of the 1972 Act to be *rejected* by the House of Commons.

- The MP represents a constituency in *part of the UK* (e.g. Scotland or Greater London) where a majority of people voted 'remain'.
- MPs are elected primarily on the basis of the *political party* to which they belong and the policy of his/her own party is for the UK to remain in the EU.
- The prime responsibility of an MP is to vote on the basis of *her/his own judgement*, even if this conflicts with majority opinion (whether in a particular constituency, a part of the UK or the UK at large) or with the policies of her/his own party.

The role of *political parties* in representative democracies raises fundamental issues.

11. The justifications listed above serve to highlight fundamental issues concerning representative democracy, especially the role of political parties. Most electors vote for candidates on the basis of the *political party* they represent rather than their personal attributes (about which very little may be known, even if we believe their CVs). An elected MP is generally expected to vote in Parliament in accordance with the policies of his/her party, including any pledges contained within its election manifesto. *However:*

- The extent to which the composition of national and local assemblies reflects voters' party preferences depends upon the nature of the electoral system. The UK's 'first-past-the-post' system operating in single member constituencies can produce very distorted results, especially where many parties compete for support.¹⁰
- Elected MPs have often received the votes of only a *minority* of constituency voters (themselves comprising only a proportion of constituency *electorates*). Those voters (often a majority) who supported other candidates/parties are unlikely to feel that their elected MPs represent them in Parliament in the sense of pursuing policies with which they would agree.
- Evidence suggests that few electors have detailed knowledge of the policies of different parties or have read their election manifestos. Electors are more likely to vote on the basis of a few key issues (as presented in the media) and general party or party leader 'image' (again as presented in the media).
- Electors who *have* read the manifesto of their chosen party cannot be assumed to support *all* of its policies/pledges. They might vote for the party *in spite of* one or more of these.
- Party policies on different issues are not always clear-cut and in any case may change between elections in the light of changing circumstances.
- MPs are expected not only to support their party's policies but *also* to exercise their judgement. On crucial issues, particularly on so-called matters of 'conscience', their judgement may force them to defy their Party Whips.

In practice, representative government means *responsible* government.

12. Although some of the above issues might be addressed in the UK by introducing a system of *proportional representation* (different versions of which exist in many modern democracies)¹¹ and of *compulsory voting* (as in Australia), it must be accepted that, whatever the system, an MP does not represent his/her constituency in the sense of being a *delegate* who votes in Parliament in line with the majority wishes of his/her constituents on particular issues (such wishes being difficult, if

¹⁰ In only one general election over the last century has the party forming the government obtained more than 50% of the popular vote. In 1931 the Conservatives attracted 55% of votes, winning 79% of parliamentary seats. In 1951 the Conservatives formed a government by obtaining 51% of seats (compared to Labour's 47%) whilst attracting fewer votes (48% compared to Labour's 49%). In 1997 Labour gained far more votes than the Conservatives (43% compared to 31%) but its share of seats was nevertheless quite disproportionate (64% compared to 25%). See Appendix 2 for more details.

¹¹ The main types of voting system are outlined in Appendix 3.

not impossible, to identify and quite possibly in conflict with the MP's own party's policies). It could be argued instead that representative government in practice means *responsible* government.¹² In other words, MPs (and through them the governments empowered by their majority support in Parliament) are *answerable* (primarily at election time) for their political conduct, including how they vote in Parliament and their loyalty, or otherwise, to party policies and principles. As long as this is open to public scrutiny, voters can judge whether or not they merit continued support.

The internal workings of political parties are crucial to the democratic process.

13. Political parties are intrinsic to the functioning of modern democracies. Joining a political party provides a way, in addition to voting in elections and referendums, of influencing the political process. Relatively few people, however, choose to do so and those who do, consequently, may enjoy an influence out of proportion to their numbers.¹³ The characteristics of party members and their role in choosing policies, candidates and leaders clearly affect democratic outcomes. Divergences of opinion within parties, sometimes voiced by competing *factions*, have to be resolved somehow. The system for involving rank-and-file members, party MPs and affiliated organisations (e.g. trade unions) will be crucial. Also relevant may be behind-the-scenes influence exercised by major party donors. The broad issue is the extent to which the internal processes of political parties operating in modern democracies *themselves* operate democratically.

Clear criteria are needed for the use of referendums.

14. Whether people favour representative or direct democracy may depend on which seems most likely to produce the outcomes they personally want. It is often argued that MPs voting in Parliament will make more informed and enlightened decisions than citizens voting directly in referendums. What is 'enlightened' to some people, however, is 'wrong-headed' to others. EU membership provides an example of an issue where the outcomes of representative and direct democracy may differ (a clear majority of MPs favouring 'remain'). Here are two further examples. Use of the death penalty in the UK was completely abolished by Parliament in 1998 (its use for murder being abolished in Great Britain in 1965 and in Northern Ireland in 1973) but a majority of people voting in a referendum would probably support its restoration.¹⁴ Currently the renationalisation of the railways would not be supported by a majority of MPs but, if public opinion polls are to be believed, would win the support of a majority of people voting in a referendum. To favour one system of democratic decision-making when it produces personally desired outcomes but not when it doesn't, is intellectually and morally unsustainable. If referendums, as a form of direct democracy, are to be superimposed upon a basic system of representative democracy then clear and objective criteria are needed for their use (e.g. regarding the type of issues for which they may or may not be appropriate and whether they are deemed to be mandatory or advisory in their outcomes).

¹² As argued by Anthony Birch in *Representative and Responsible Government*, Allen & Unwin, 1964

¹³ As at 1 December 2013 (the latest date for which an estimate is available), the Conservative party had 150,000 members. As at 1 July 2016, Labour had 550,000 members, the SNP 120,000, Liberal Democrats 76,000, the Green Party 56,000, UKIP 39,000 and Plaid Cymru 8,000.

¹⁴ The 13th Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights, of which the UK is a signatory, prohibits the restoration of the death penalty. The Convention was originally drawn up in 1950 by the Council of Europe (not to be confused with the European Council of the EU) of which the UK was a founder member and which now has 47 member states including, since 1996, Russia (but not Belarus due to its use of the death penalty and its human rights abuses nor the Vatican City due to its being a theocracy, not a democracy). A referendum vote to restore the death penalty, therefore, could be implemented only if the UK ceased to be a party to the Convention and a member of the Council of Europe.

Referendums are needed when determining the political future of sub-national groups.

15. Referendums appear not just appropriate but *necessary* when determining the future governance of constituent parts of a nation state. Of the twelve referendums held in the UK since 1973, eight have related to the governance of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and one to the governance of Greater London. In all cases the right to vote was restricted to people living in the areas concerned. Their wishes were deemed paramount even though people living elsewhere in the UK might have had strong, and possibly opposing, views on the subject. In the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence, for example, the issue was regarded as one to be decided by a majority of people living in Scotland, not in the entire UK. It could be argued that this is merely to accept the reality that any attempt by a majority of people in an entire nation state to frustrate the expressed desire of a majority of people living in *part* of it for some form of self-governance (or perhaps complete independence) or to merge with *another* nation state (e.g. for Northern Ireland to become part of the Irish Republic), is likely to provoke civil unrest, if not civil war.¹⁵

But problems arise when sub-national groups are themselves internally divided.

16. In determining the future governance of areas, a big problem arises if a minority group feels so alienated from a majority group that it regards majority rule as a form of *tyranny*. The 1973 Northern Ireland referendum, for example, was *boycotted* by the Nationalist/Catholic minority as most could not accept the validity of a process dominated by the Unionist/Protestant majority. All this illustrates the problem (referred to in paragraph 4) that membership of a nation state is *involuntary* and people may find themselves living with others (perhaps a majority) who possess a substantially different set of values from their own and with whom they cannot agree (or at least agree to differ). The problem appears to arise particularly, although not exclusively, where different religious groups (including different sects of the same religion) oppose one another. The fluidity of institutional reality and the scope for changing attitudes and beliefs (see paragraph 3) may make possible some form of resolution (e.g. the Northern Ireland power-sharing system approved in the 1998 referendum). However, in some circumstances the re-drawing of national boundaries, perhaps with substantial re-location of population, might be unavoidable and the process might involve a break-up into smaller nation states (e.g. as with former Yugoslavia).

Particular problems arise where a disaffected minority is dispersed throughout the population.

17. The situation is particularly problematic where majority government is viewed as tyrannical by a minority that is not geographically concentrated but *dispersed* throughout the population and where there is thus no scope for resolving matters by devolving powers or granting independence to a constituent part of the country. Democratic systems work only if minorities are prepared to

¹⁵ The *viability* of any proposed new political arrangement and the *drawing of boundaries* are critical issues. Even if a majority of its residents wanted it, a 'Republic of Kingston upon Thames', for example, would appear as impracticable as the 'Burgundian State of Pimlico' featured in the 1949 Ealing Studios comedy *Passport to Pimlico*. Following the Brexit vote, some Londoners have suggested, at least half-seriously, that Greater London (where a majority of residents voted 'remain' and with a population exceeding that of many nation states) should become an independent state staying within the EU. The precise drawing of boundaries and border arrangements with neighbouring areas such as Surrey, however, would pose an interesting challenge! In practice, realistic potential for 'home rule' has been confined to the historic (but, with population movement, perhaps increasingly irrelevant) 'national' sub-divisions of the UK i.e. England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Historic sub-divisions of England such as Northumbria, Mercia and Wessex do not appear to loom sufficiently large in the psyche of residents to provide any such potential although some residents of Cornwall still call for an independent 'Kernow' and some people who consider themselves 'northerners' (although to people living in Scotland they are 'southerners') seek home rule for 'The North' (although the boundaries envisaged are unclear, as is the extent to which people living in, for example, Yorkshire, Lancashire and Northumberland, possess a sufficient sense of common identity). The prospect of England dividing into separate 'North' and 'South' states (perhaps with passport control at Watford Gap) seems remote to the point of being non-existent.

accept, however reluctantly, majority decisions. Whether we find ourselves in a majority or minority varies from issue to issue and over time. We cannot expect others to comply with the majority choices we like if we are not ourselves prepared to comply with the ones we don't. Generally we are able to adopt a 'win some, lose some' attitude to accepting the outcomes of majority decision-making. *However*, the limits of compliance are tested where social, economic, religious, ethnic or other divisions run very deep and a government, with majority backing, imposes measures that clearly favour some groups whilst severely disadvantaging others. Measures affecting ownership rights and the distribution of income and wealth may prove particularly challenging.

Programmes of change at first considered radical can become the accepted norm.

18. The most radical programme of change in the UK over the last century – that of the 1945-51 Labour government – included the nationalisation of key industries, the establishment of a comprehensive system of social security, the creation of a National Health Service and the introduction of the modern town and country planning system. It involved the transfer of assets from private to public ownership, restrictions on the development rights of landowners and a major redistribution of income from rich to poor through taxes/benefits and the provision of public services free at the point of delivery. At the time, Labour's programme was regarded by many members of the privileged classes as undiluted communism. In spite of their privileged position, however, they were not well placed to oppose it due to the circumstances of the time i.e. the strong desire of most people – who had experienced the positive results of a centrally planned war effort demanding *collective* co-operation – to build a better and fairer future. In the event, a post-war *consensus* was established around Labour's key reforms. Conservative governments in the 1950s, indeed, sought to *outdo* rather than undo some aspects (achieving, for example, record levels of house-building including the building of *social* housing). Even now, in spite of privatisations, much of the system remains intact including, albeit precariously, the NHS.

The subversion of majority governments by minority vested interests cannot be ruled out.

19. It is interesting to speculate what might be the reaction of powerful elites to a future government that seeks, *inter alia*, to re-nationalise some industries, impose much higher top-end tax rates on income/wealth and fund a big expansion in the public provision of health, housing and other key services/facilities. They might view such attempts with complacency, confident of their ability to avoid/evade taxes by situating their assets, and if necessary themselves, in a convenient and comfortable tax haven abroad. However, a 'dirty tricks' campaign (of borderline legality and perhaps involving some form of economic sabotage) cannot be ruled out¹⁶ – although fears of a military coup would appear fanciful. In the UK (unlike in some countries such as Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey) there has been a long tradition of political neutrality and non-interference on the part of the armed forces. The political views of military personnel, moreover, are likely to range as widely as within the general population, providing no focus for the emergence of an armed forces 'party', with its own political agenda.¹⁷ The sworn allegiance of the armed forces to a constitutional monarch, it is argued by some, also helps safeguard against a military coup.¹⁸

¹⁶ The revelations of former MI5 officer Peter Wright in his book *Spycatcher* (published in Australia in 1987 and initially banned in the UK) included the allegation that elements within the CIA and MI5 suspected Prime Minister Harold Wilson of being a closet communist and agent of the Soviet Union and plotted how to undermine his government. If there were/are such elements, one wonders how they might have reacted had a Labour government led by Michael Foot been elected in 1983 or how they might react if a Labour government led by Jeremy Corbyn is elected in 2020.

¹⁷ The English army played an important role in the restoration of the monarchy in 1660 and in the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688. Earlier, during the English Civil War (1642-51), the *politicisation* of the army had become a major issue. In 1647 the Church of St Mary the Virgin in Putney provided the opening venue for the so-called 'Putney Debates' (see Appendix

A government, even if it has majority support, cannot command the allegiance of citizens who consider it fundamentally evil.

20. A crisis for a minority of people (quite possibly a large minority) occurs if they are faced by a government with an agenda they find deeply immoral but which has majority support (as happened when Hitler's National Socialist Party was elected to power in Germany in the early 1930s). Individuals must reserve the right to *reject* rule by a government they consider evil, whether or not it is supported by a majority of citizens (including, perhaps, the odd philosopher such as Heidegger). An obvious recourse for them is to protest and call for change. However, such a government is more than likely to pervert/destroy democratic processes and to suppress dissent. The only resort then (other than to keep a low profile in the hope that things will change, or flee to the jurisdiction of another state) is to pursue a campaign of non-cooperation, subversion, sabotage or violent struggle. It is irrelevant for the government to protest that it has majority support. Even if this is true, the whole basis for democracy (i.e. that majorities do not tyrannise minorities by imposing upon them measures they cannot possibly, even grudgingly and under protest, accept) will have broken down.

It is arrogant to write people off as 'the mob', even if we doubt their judgement.

21. Whenever we find ourselves in a losing minority, it is tempting to write off the winning majority as the 'mob' or the 'herd'. Such an attitude towards people with whom we lack empathy is displayed, in all its arrogance, by some philosophers (e.g. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche). A classic example of the pretension to intellectual and moral superiority to which some members of the philosophy 'profession' are prone is Plato's notion of government by an elite of 'philosopher kings'. Anyone attracted by this idea should consider which of our current crop of 'philosophers' might qualify and what sort of government ('deconstructionist', perhaps) might emerge. It is nevertheless the case that we all, to an extent, distrust the capacity of many of our fellow citizens to make reasoned judgements. This was definitely the case with the EU referendum, a depressing number of people displaying, when interviewed, an ignorance of basic facts combined with an inability to speak, and presumably think, other than in slogans. Winston Churchill, when arguing *for* democracy, described it as the worst system of government in the world *until we compare it with the alternatives*, but he also joked that the strongest argument *against* democracy is a five-minute conversation with a voter.

Universal adult suffrage is a *recent* phenomenon.

22. The democratisation of government in the UK has involved, over the centuries, a slow and spasmodic extension of the right to vote, often resisted by those who already possessed it on the grounds that others were not fit to exercise it responsibly. The principal bases for discrimination have been class and gender. Class-based discrimination was achieved largely by imposing a *property*

4) in which the 'Grandeess' (notably Oliver Cromwell and his son-in-law Henry Ireton) of the New Model Army sought to moderate the demands of its more radical factions. Many were influenced by the Christian-inspired ideas of the Levellers (led by John Lilburne) and the Diggers or True Levellers (led by Gerrard Winstanley). Some called for universal male suffrage, biennial parliaments and recognition of the supremacy of the House of Commons. In the event, the escape from captivity of Charles I and the resumption of fighting diverted attention elsewhere and those elements in the army considered most troublesome by its commanding officers were ruthlessly suppressed.

¹⁸ In Greece, however, it did not stop the colonels' seizure of power in 1967 (at first endorsed, perhaps under duress, by King Constantine II who later fled to Italy after a failed counter-coup). Their military junta survived until 1974. Perhaps Costa Rica's lone status as an enduring beacon of democracy amongst the countries of Central America (so many of which have been plagued by military coups) is at least partially due to the *disbanding* of its armed forces in 1950.

qualification on the right to vote,¹⁹ the effect for most of the period being to exclude all but a small minority of adults.²⁰ During the 19th century, three Reform Acts widened the franchise but it was not until the Representation of the People Act 1918 that it was extended to all males aged 21+ regardless of property status. For centuries women were disenfranchised, being generally debarred from inheriting real estate (i.e. land) and, until the Married Women's Property Act 1882, surrendering property rights to their husbands. Some limited rights to vote in local elections were granted in the late 19th century but it took a major shift in social attitudes, a campaign of civil disobedience and the economic impact of WW1 for women to gain the right to vote in all elections. Under the 1918 Act, however, the right was given only to women aged 30+ who met a property qualification, about 60% of women remaining disenfranchised. Not until 1928 was full equality with men achieved.²¹ The principle of 'one adult, one vote' is now well-established²² (although a marginal issue remains regarding voting age, some calling for it to be lowered to 16 from its present level, set in 1969, of 18).

Acceptance of universal adult suffrage has required a radical change in attitudes concerning the ability of people at large to make rationally and emotionally mature decisions.

23. Because universal adult suffrage is now commonplace and uncontentious, it is easy to forget how radical a shift in perceptions and attitudes its acceptance has involved. Well into the 19th century, the claim that *every* adult (i.e. regardless of gender, class, etc.) should have an *equal* say in the governance of the country would have seemed revolutionary, 'democracy' being widely equated with 'mob rule' or 'anarchy'. Its widespread acceptance today evidences a recognition that the characteristics which people have in common far outweigh those that differentiate them. Thus, although people differ in levels of intelligence and education, the right to vote is not based upon passing a test of IQ or knowledge. Intelligence does not guarantee commonsense and, crucially, politics is concerned with *normative* issues i.e. what people *want*. Although choices need to be *rational* (involving reasoned arguments related to relevant evidence), they are also bound to be *emotional* (involving feelings and desires in relation to which identified possibilities can be *evaluated*). A *marriage* of reason and emotion is involved (the philosopher David Hume attributing too subordinate a role to reason when he claimed it to be only the "*slave* of the passions").

Human proneness to irrational belief is evidenced in the survival of ghosts from the past such as the British monarchy and aristocracy.

24. Confusion results when emotional factors cause us to abandon rationality and disregard evidence. Particularly disturbing is the human proclivity for myth-making and the attribution of semi-mystical qualities to selected individuals either because they manufacture/project a

¹⁹ A law passed in 1430 limited the franchise to so-called 'forty-shilling freeholders' (i.e. owners of the freehold of land bringing in an annual rent of at least 40 shillings), although 'freehold' came to be interpreted quite loosely.

²⁰ The justification for this generally offered by *property owners* (it was offered by Henry Ireton, a member of the landed gentry, in the Putney Debates - see footnote 17 and Appendix 4) was that only *they*, by virtue of such ownership, had a direct stake in the government of the country and that other people, if enfranchised, might then seize for themselves any property they fancied.

²¹ The subjection of women characterises male-dominated societies. Even reformers such as the 19th century Chartists who were considered radical in their demands for adult suffrage, had in mind only *male* adults. The People's Charter drawn up in 1838 called for: 1. All men to have the vote (universal male suffrage); 2. Voting to take place by secret ballot; 3. General elections to be every year, not once every five years; 4. Constituencies to be of equal size; 5. MPs to be paid; 6. The property qualification for becoming an MP to be abolished. A notable call for gender equality was made by the philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-73) in his essay *The Subjection of Women* (1869).

²² The right of some people to vote in more than one constituency (by virtue of the separate 'university constituencies' or the ownership of business/shop premises) was abolished by the Representation of the People Act 1948.

charismatic image (e.g. demagogues such as Hitler)²³ or because they are thought to possess, by virtue of 'blood-line' or 'God-line', some special quality that gives them the right to positions of power and privilege. An obvious example of the latter is the British monarchy and aristocracy. It is bizarre that a country that prides itself on its democratic credentials should enshrine in its political institutions the trappings, and to some extent the reality, of its feudal past – of which the wholly unelected House of Lords is an obvious relic. Of its current 810 members, 92 are hereditary peers and 26 are bishops, the rest being life peers (first introduced in 1958 and appointed by the Queen on the advice of the Prime Minister). Although halved in size in 2000, the House of Lords has since expanded significantly, David Cameron creating more life peers than any of his predecessors.²⁴ The House of Lords provides a route by which people who have never been elected by anyone can fill major offices of state (e.g. Margaret Thatcher's appointment of businessman David Young as Secretary of State for Employment in 1985 and Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in 1987).

A unicameral Parliament is the obvious choice for the UK.

25. Whilst the *unelected* House of Lords continues to *grow*, it is currently proposed that the *elected* House of Commons be *cut* from 650 to 600 MPs.²⁵ A draft bill in 2012 proposing that the Upper House be reduced to 300 members (of whom 80% would be elected by single transferable vote and 20% appointed and who would serve non-renewable 15 year terms) was dropped due to opposition from within the Conservative Party. Any proposal to reform the House of Lords, in any case, begs the question of its *purpose*. In countries with federal constitutions (such as the USA and Australia) the role of a Senate is to provide representation for their constituent states. In the UK, however, the primary purpose of the House of Lords appears to be to double-check (with limited powers of delay) the work of the House of Commons. An *elected* Upper Chamber would raise the issue of which of the two Houses of Parliament truly represents the electorate, a recipe for conflict and confusion. To elect one set of representatives to the House of Commons and then, presumably because we do not entirely trust their competence, elect a *separate* set to the House of Lords to keep an eye on them is surely ridiculous. Starting with a clean slate, ignoring ghosts from the past, the obvious choice is to have a *single* Assembly (as is the case with many countries in the world including, for example, Sweden, Denmark and New Zealand). Resources can then be fully devoted to serving the *one* assembly, ensuring it is well supported with research facilities/staff and housed in premises that are fit for purpose.²⁶

The degree of democratisation within different countries varies widely. Basic requirements for democracy can be identified.

26. A binary division of countries into 'democratic' and 'undemocratic' is hopelessly simplistic. The reality is a wide variation in the *degree* of democratisation in different countries, the crucial

²³ It is a sad but probable truth that Donald Trump would never have been *considered*, let alone selected, as Republican candidate for the US Presidency but for his 'star' role in the TV 'reality' (i.e. artificial and contrived) show *The Apprentice*.

²⁴ The House of Lords reached a maximum size of 1,330 in 1999 before being reduced to 669 in 2000 with the removal of all but 92 hereditary peers.

²⁵ This is being linked spuriously to the re-drawing of constituency boundaries to achieve a nearer equality of electorates. Occasional re-drawing has always been necessary to allow for differential population change but there is no reason why it need involve a reduction in the number of constituencies. Indeed, the House of Commons is not much larger now than about a century ago (650 MPs now compared with 615 in 1922) whilst the population has grown by about a half, justifying an *increase* in the number of constituencies if past ratios of MPs to electors are to be preserved.

²⁶ The current need for major repairs to the Victorian mock-medieval edifice that largely comprises the Palace of Westminster provides an opportune occasion to re-house Parliament *permanently* in new fit-for-purpose premises, perhaps located more centrally in the UK. Its designers, of course, would need to know whether it is intended to house a *unicameral* or a *bicameral* Parliament.

issue being how to judge this. A broad distinction can be made between 'thin' concepts of democracy that concentrate upon political institutions/processes and 'thick' concepts that in addition consider wider societal/cultural aspects. The *pluralist theory of democracy* expounded by the American political scientist Robert Dahl (1915-2014)²⁷ characterises modern democracies as *polyarchies* (the literal meaning of 'polyarchy' being 'rule by the many'), the basic requirements for which are: all adults are free to vote, stand for public office, form/join political parties, express their political views and access diverse and uncensored sources of information; politicians compete freely for votes; elections are free and fair; government policies respond to citizens' preferences expressed electorally and otherwise (see Appendix 5 for Dahl's full description).

A measure of the extent of 'freedom' in different countries is provided by *Freedom House*.

27. The US-based *Freedom House* organisation²⁸ reports each year on the extent to which different countries in the world can be considered 'free'. Each is scored (from 0 to 4) against 25 measures (10 concerning political rights and 15 civil liberties), giving a maximum possible score of 100. The relevant scores are used to produce separate ratings (on a 7 point scale, 1 representing most free and 7 least free) for political rights and civil liberties. On the basis of these, each country is categorised as Free, Partly Free or Not Free. A country is considered an 'electoral democracy' if it has: a competitive, multiparty political system; universal adult suffrage; regular elections with secret and reasonably secure/fraud-free ballots; significant political party access to the electorate via the media and open campaigning. All 'Free' and most 'Partly Free' countries are deemed to meet these criteria and, therefore, count as 'electoral democracies'.

The *Economist* Intelligence Unit provides an annual 'Index of Democracy'.

28. The Intelligence Unit of the *Economist Group* (publishers of the *Economist* magazine)²⁹ have produced (since 2006) an annual Index of Democracy (covering 165 countries in the world). It is based upon 60 questions, some with two possible answers (scored 0 or 1) and some with three (scored 0, 0.5 or 1). The questions cover five topics: electoral process and pluralism; functioning of government; political participation; political culture; civil liberties. An index (in the range 0 to 10) is produced for each of these topics by multiplying the average score for its questions by 10. A simple average of these five indices then gives an overall Democracy Index (again in the range 0 to 10), on the basis of which countries are divided into four types: full democracy (8 - 10); flawed democracy (6 - 7.9); hybrid (4 - 5.9); authoritarian (below 4).³⁰

Measures of freedom/democracy are affected by choice of questions and quality of judgements.

29. Measures of freedom/democracy reflect the questions upon which they are based and their relative weightings. Appendix 6 lists the *Freedom House* and *Economist* questions. Equally important is how the questions are answered. Both organisations rely heavily on the judgements of 'experts' but the *Economist* Index also uses information from the World Values Survey (carried out

²⁷ See: Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, 2015 (2nd Edition) (1st Edition 1998), Yale University Press

²⁸ "Freedom House is an independent watchdog organization dedicated to the expansion of freedom and democracy around the world. We analyze the challenges to freedom, advocate for greater political rights and civil liberties, and support frontline activists to defend human rights and promote democratic change. Founded in 1941, Freedom House was the first American organization to champion the advancement of freedom globally." (Description on *Freedom House* website).

See: <https://freedomhouse.org> https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf and <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/methodology>

²⁹ See: www.eiu.com/

³⁰ For a description of the Index and its methodology see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index and http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf

by a network of social scientists since 1981).³¹ *Freedom House* states that: "The survey findings are reached after a multilayered process of analysis and evaluation by a team of regional experts and scholars. Although there is an element of subjectivity inherent in the survey findings, the ratings process emphasizes intellectual rigor and balanced and unbiased judgments."

Countries range widely in the extent of freedom and democracy enjoyed by their citizens.

30. Appendices 7 and 8 show, respectively, the *Freedom House* and *Economist* findings for 2015.³² Appendix 9 allows a ready comparison to be made of their scores and rankings for each country. Considering the differences in questions/methodology, their results are remarkably similar. The table below shows the scores and rankings for a few selected countries.

Examples of <i>Freedom House</i> and <i>Economist</i> Scores/Rankings 2015						
Country	<i>Freedom House</i>			<i>Economist</i>		
	Freedom Score	Rank	Freedom Type	Democracy Score	Rank	Democracy Type
Norway	100	=1	Free	9.93	1	Full
Germany	95	=18	Free	8.64	13	Full
United Kingdom	95	=18	Free	8.31	16	Full
United States	90	=30	Free	8.05	20	Full
France	91	=28	Free	7.92	27	Flawed
Brazil	81	=46	Free	6.96	51	Flawed
India	77	=56	Free	7.74	35	Flawed
Indonesia	65	=69	Partly free	7.03	49	Flawed
Turkey	53	95	Partly free	5.12	96	Hybrid
Bangladesh	49	101	Partly free	5.73	85	Hybrid
Nigeria	48	=102	Partly free	4.62	107	Hybrid
Pakistan	41	=110	Partly free	4.40	110	Hybrid
Russia	22	139	Not free	3.31	=130	Authoritarian
China	16	=150	Not free	3.14	=134	Authoritarian
Saudi Arabia	10	157	Not free	1.93	=158	Authoritarian
North Korea	3	=162	Not free	1.08	165	Authoritarian

Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia (an absolute monarchy) and North Korea (in practice a hereditary dictatorship although in theory a communist state calling itself a *Democratic People's Republic*³³) are at or near the bottom in terms of both freedom and democracy. No doubt the governments, and perhaps most of the citizens, of Russia and China (both of which rank below, for example, Myanmar and Iraq) would contest their countries' 'not free' and 'authoritarian' designations and attribute them to bias on the part of *Freedom House* and the *Economist*. Similarly, countries such as France and India might contest their *Economist* designation as *flawed* democracies. Nevertheless, the methodologies used are transparent and it is always possible to check how different answers to some of the questions would affect overall scores and rankings. Slight differences in these should not be regarded as too significant (many countries having the same or similar scores) and the broad

³¹ See: www.worldvaluessurvey.org

³² For comparative purposes, the tables relate only to the 165 countries examined by the *Economist* (which excludes very small countries that it deems 'micro-states'). *Freedom House* looks at 195 countries and 15 territories.

³³ The keenness of some authoritarian countries to be considered 'democratic' might appear a minor victory for the concept of democracy, hypocrisy being 'the homage paid by vice to virtue'. The misapplication of the term, however, is liable to debase it.

categories are obviously crude (a very small fall in its *Economist* score, for example, would reduce the United States from a 'full' to a 'flawed' democracy). As a broad generalisation, Western European (particularly Scandinavian), North American and Antipodean countries display the highest levels of democratisation whilst those with the lowest levels are to be found in the Middle East, Africa and Asia (see Appendix 8). According to Freedom House, more than 2½ billion people live in countries that it designates 'Not Free', over a third of the world's population.

Democracies can be as restrictive of individual freedom as any other type of political system.

31. A close connection between 'freedom' and 'democracy' is widely assumed. *Freedom House*, for example, states that "freedom is possible only in democratic political environments where governments are accountable to their own people; the rule of law prevails; and freedoms of expression, association, and belief, as well as respect for the rights of minorities and women, are guaranteed". The freedoms inherent in democratic systems, however, are concerned primarily with the *practices and processes* that give individuals an equal say in collective decision-making. The decisions thus made often *restrict* individual freedom by requiring citizens to perform certain acts (e.g. pay taxes), observe regulations (e.g. regarding health and safety), obtain permission before doing certain things (e.g. develop land) and refrain from acts considered anti-social or immoral (e.g. take mind-altering drugs). Depending upon the attitudes and beliefs of the majority of citizens, a democracy can be just as restrictive of individual freedom as a dictatorship. It could be argued that in a democracy such restrictions are *self-imposed* and that people will not impose upon themselves anything they do not like. However, this is to ignore human diversity and the possibility that what majorities and minorities want can be radically different. Many freedoms (e.g. freedom from poverty and ill-health), moreover, require *positive action*. Such freedoms will be denied to disadvantaged people living in a democracy where the majority preference is for unbridled free enterprise and the minimisation of taxes and government spending.

Rousseau postulates the existence of a *general will* distinct from individual wills.

32. The problems for democratic government posed by the divergent desires of individuals was recognised by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78). In his seminal work *The Social Contract* (1762), he postulates the existence of a *general will* distinct from *individual wills*. "The general will is always rightful and always tends to the public good; but it does not follow that the deliberations of the people are equally right. We always want what is advantageous to us but we do not always discern it... the general will studies only the common interest while the will of all studies private interest, and is indeed no more than the sum of individual desires. But if we take away from these same wills, the pluses and minuses which cancel each other out, the balance which remains is the general will." To minimise the differences needing to be 'cancelled out', Rousseau argues, the emergence of rival groups and factions should be avoided. "Thus if the general will is to be clearly expressed, it is imperative that there should be no sectional associations in the state, and that every citizen should make up his own mind for himself."

Trying to apply the concept of the general will to a practical example reveals its incoherence.

33. Rousseau fails to apply his concept of the general will to a single practical example. As soon as we try, its incoherence becomes apparent. Of those who voted in the EU referendum, 52% favoured 'leave' and 48% 'remain'. Supposedly, behind this clear divergence of opinion there is a *general will* regarding UK membership of the EU. But what is it? Where does it exist? How could we ever identify it? What 'pluses and minuses' of opposing views could be 'cancelled out' to reveal an underlying unanimity of opinion? It is, of course, possible that *some* differences might be resolved through argument and debate; although Rousseau, fearing factionalism, appears to want to *avoid*

such intercommunication: "From the deliberations of a people properly informed, and provided its members do not have any communication among themselves, the great number of small differences will always produce a general will and the decision will always be good". The obvious reality is: many differences of opinion are *not* resolved through argument; the best we can hope for is to 'agree to differ'; as collective decisions often *have* to be made and for want of a better/fairer system, there is generally no choice but to accept, however reluctantly, the wishes of the majority.

The general will is not just a *myth* but a *dangerous myth*.

34. Rousseau's general will is a classic example of a metaphysical construct lacking coherence. It is a *myth*. Worse than that, it is a *dangerous myth*. Throughout history there has been no shortage of individuals (Hitler is a notable example) who assert the existence of a 'will of the people' (distinct from the wills of individual people) which, for some reason, they can perceive but to which others may be blind. In the name of 'the people' they then proceed, if we let them, to imprison, torture and murder anyone who fails to share their 'vision'. The same fanatical mindset is displayed by religious extremists who claim privileged insight into the 'will of God' (an equally dangerous metaphysical construct) and who are prepared to eliminate anyone who opposes them. It is disturbing that the language used by so many *democratic* politicians *propagates* the myth of the general will. On so many issues, including UK membership of the EU, countless politicians parrot phrases such as "the people have spoken" and "the will of the people must be observed".³⁴ The reality is that different people want different things and the best we can do is identify majority opinions. Talk of 'the will of the people', it should be noted, prompts the question '*which* people'? Generally, users of the term 'the people' have in mind some *sub-group* of the world's entire population to which they feel they somehow 'belong'.³⁵

Democracy can be understood only as a feature of *social and institutional reality*.

35. It should be apparent from the above that any discussion of democracy cannot avoid consideration of the *nature of reality* and, specifically, *social/institutional* reality (see paragraphs 2 and 3). If we discount the possibility (and meaningfulness) of a collective consciousness floating around in the 'ether', the only place where all the paraphernalia of our social world can exist is in our separate heads. It is amazing but true that the very limited means of intercommunication between such heads produces enough commonality of content to make possible human interaction and cooperation in so many aspects of our lives including the political. Such commonality, however, is only *partial*. What goes on in the heads of different people, including the *conceptual frameworks* involved, vary widely. The fact that such frameworks may incorporate *myths* (about 'gods', 'nationalities', 'races', etc.) does not make them any the less powerful. The only way to combat such myths, especially the most pernicious, is to subject them to the rigour of intellectual argument and the constant demand for *evidence*.³⁶ Only in this way can social/institutional reality (essentially a

³⁴ Perhaps the assembly chamber of a new House of Parliament (see footnote 26) could incorporate an 'empty rhetoric and conceptual twaddle alert' which buzzes/flashes every time an MP parrots phrases such as 'the British people', 'the great British public', 'hard-working people', 'Brexit means Brexit', 'a country that works for everyone', etc., etc. Serial offenders might be subjected to some minor physical sanction (perhaps involving a wet fish).

³⁵ Had Rousseau completed *The Social Contract* "by considering the foreign relations of the state", he might have wondered whether, transcending the supposed general wills of different national groupings of people, there might be an overarching general will of all the people in the world and how these different general wills might relate to one another. He might then have realised the complete incoherence of his notion of the general will. Unfortunately he decided that such consideration represented "a new subject too vast for my weak vision".

³⁶ When EU 'quitters' say, for example, that they "want their country back" we must demand to know exactly what they mean by 'their country' and what 'getting it back' might involve.

constantly changing human *construct*) evolve in a direction that enhances the quality of human lives and postpones for as long as possible the eventual/inevitable demise of the human species.

Democratic systems are means not ends. People may prioritise other things.

36. Although the *attitudes and beliefs* inherent in democratic systems of government are valuable for their own sake, the systems themselves represent *means* (for resolving differences and making group decisions), not *ends*. If they fail to deliver the ends which most people seek, they are liable to be abandoned. Arguably, most individuals' prime concern is with the well-being of themselves and the members of the groups with which they identify (although how 'well-being' is interpreted will depend upon social/cultural influences including, perhaps, some which promote a mindless obsession with material possessions and 'economic growth'). If some other system of government appears more likely to deliver what they want, particularly if times are hard (as during the Great Depression of the 1930s), people may turn to it in the naive belief that it will prove benevolent and beneficial, even though democratically unaccountable.

In large communities, democratic government is bound to be *primarily* representative. New ways of representing people's views, however, might be found.

37. It is probable that few people devote much time to thinking about the nature of democracy and that many lack any sense of personal empowerment by virtue of their right, along with millions of others, to vote occasionally in elections and referendums (although to complain that one's individual vote makes no difference is rather to miss the point of democracy i.e. that each person's vote should count the same and no single individual should have any more influence than anyone else). Rousseau comments that "The English people believes itself to be free; it is gravely mistaken; it is only so during the election of Members of Parliament; as soon as the Members are elected, the people is enslaved", thereby questioning the democratic status of *representative* government (constituting, in his terminology, 'elective aristocracy'). He appears ambivalent, at the same time, about the practical possibility of *direct* democracy in anything other than small assemblies of people, when he states: "If there were a nation of Gods, it would govern itself democratically. A government so perfect is not suited to men." In sizeable communities, democratic government seems bound to be *primarily* representative, although direct elements (e.g. referendums) can be added and new ways of improving the democratic process might be found.

Sortition might provide a way of making democratic choices better informed.

38. An innovation worth considering is the drawing by *lot* of panels of citizens (the method used to select jury members) to assist in the determination of government policy. *Quota sampling* (commonly used in social/market research) can help ensure that the panels are representative (e.g. in terms of age, sex and social class). A general term for selection by lot is *sortition*. In an article in *The Guardian*,³⁷ David Van Reybrouk refers to experiments in the use of sortition that have been carried out in the US, Australia, the Netherlands and the Irish Republic. In Ireland in 2012, a Convention comprising 33 elected politicians and 66 'ordinary people' (selected by quota sampling) was set up to identify and consider possible revisions to articles of the Irish constitution (concerning, for example, same-sex marriage, the rights of women and the ban on blasphemy). The Convention received input from experts and the public at large and its recommendations were then voted on by the two chambers of the Irish parliament. Van Reybrouk argues that had such a process been used regarding UK membership of the EU, a much more informed and rational choice would

³⁷ "Why elections are bad for democracy", *The Guardian*, 29 June 2016. The article comprises edited extracts from Van Reybrouk's book: *The Case for Democracy*, The Bodley Head, 2016. For the text of the article see: <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/29/why-elections-are-bad-for-democracy>

have resulted. "What if this procedure had been applied in the UK last week? What if a random sample of citizens had a chance to learn from experts, listen to proposals, talk to each other and engage with politicians? What if a mixed group of elected and drafted citizens had thought the matter through? What if the rest of society could have had a chance to follow and contribute to their deliberations? What if the proposals this group would have come up with had been subjected to public scrutiny? Do we think a similarly reckless decision would have been taken?"

Selection of national/local government *decision-makers* by lot, however, is undesirable.

39. With the type of sortition described above, citizen panels, selected by lot, make policy *recommendations* but not *decisions*. Making policy *decisions* remains the province of elected representatives. But could sortition be used to select the people who are given *decision-making* powers? In the UK, a mere 650 MPs exercise such powers on behalf of 65.1 million people (including 44.7 million electors). In Kingston upon Thames, just 48 councillors make decisions on behalf of 170,000 people (including 119,000 electors). Could MPs and councillors be *selected by lot* rather than *elected*? Proponents of this (there are some) may cite the selection of public officials by lot in Ancient Greece and some medieval Italian cities. Rather than refer to historical examples about which much is unknown, however, we need to consider how such a system might in practice work *now*. Imagine that in the UK, instead of electing MPs, we select 1,000 people by *lot* to serve as representatives in Parliament.³⁸ The following is likely to be the case.

- Selection would be limited to those with the time/inclination to do the job (it is hard to see how people could be *forced* into it or, if they were, what the value of their contribution would be).
- Those selected will initially comprise a heterogeneous and unstructured group, although factions may emerge. Their 'rawness' will give immense power to officials (e.g. civil servants) who are likely to set the agenda and upon whose guidance they will rely heavily.
- They will not always agree and will presumably make decisions by majority voting.
- Initially, the public at large will have no idea of the policy direction they are likely to pursue.
- Policies, as they emerge, may prove unpopular but the representatives, being unelected, have no incentive to modify/change them, knowing that, at the end of their term of office, they will be simply replaced by another randomly selected set of individuals.
- The repeated replacement of one random set of 'unknowns' by another makes continuity of personnel impossible and of policy unlikely.

From these considerations alone, it should be clear that selecting national and local decision-makers by lot is not just impracticable but *undesirable*.

Whilst not the 'be all and end all' of representative democracy, elections are *indispensable* to it.

40. There is, perhaps, a growing cynicism about the exploitation of elective democracy by career politicians more concerned with their own personal advancement than achieving good things for people at large. Van Reybrouk argues that "the fundamental cause of democratic fatigue syndrome lies in the fact that we have all become electoral fundamentalists, venerating elections but despising the people who are elected. Electoral fundamentalism is an unshakeable belief that democracy is inconceivable without elections and elections are a necessary and fundamental precondition when speaking of democracy. Electoral fundamentalists refuse to regard elections as a means of taking part in democracy, seeing them instead as an end in themselves, as a doctrine with an intrinsic, inalienable value." *However*, the fact that elections are means not ends, does not make them *dispensable*. As already argued, democracy is bound to be *primarily* representative and there

³⁸ A *stratified* sampling system would be needed to ensure a fair geographic spread across the country, although, with a sample size of only 1,000, this would be difficult to combine with a *quota* system designed to achieve a representative spread in terms of personal characteristics.

is no obvious way of selecting representatives other than by election (certainly not selecting them by lot). The personal ambition of some politicians, moreover, might be *advantageous* to democratic accountability by making them, because they want to be re-elected, more attentive to the views of their constituents. Here-today-gone-tomorrow 'lottery winners' lack this incentive.

Social/economic inequality is reflected in unequal influence over the political process.

41. The interests of people vary widely depending upon their social/economic position. Even though very *unequal* in terms of such position, they supposedly have *equal* influence over collective decision-making by virtue of their right to vote in elections and referendums. The political process, however, is not just about voting. It is affected by many other factors including:

- Sources of information, many of which are controlled by a small number of individuals (e.g. media barons such as Rupert Murdoch) who propagandise on behalf of sectional interests.
- The susceptibility of political parties (see paragraph 13) to influence by interest groups and by the main suppliers of party funds.
- The social/educational background of people who get actively involved in party politics and who are likely to be selected as party candidates.
- Behind-the-scenes lobbying of MPs (and perhaps their 'recruitment' through the payment of 'retainers') by business and other interest groups (e.g. fossil fuel producers/suppliers).
- Contacts between government ministers/officials and representatives of key sectors of the economy (e.g. banking), upon whose co-operation governments depend.

There is much that is good about democracy in the UK but it needs to be strengthened/deepened.

42. In spite of the above, there are some 'reasons to be cheerful' about the state of democracy in the UK, including the following.

- Campaigning and lobbying by different interest groups is not just an inevitable feature of pluralist societies but, *as long as done openly and honestly*, a vital way of raising issues for public discussion/decision. In the UK a multiplicity of pressure groups campaign freely for all sorts of causes.
- Many pressure groups are not self-interested but concerned with the well-being of others (e.g. of homeless people).
- The media, although *partly* controlled by a few rich people, is not state controlled and expresses a wide diversity of opinion.
- Elections are fundamentally free and fair and incidences of corruption are minimal.
- An independent judiciary interprets the law and seeks to maintain constitutional propriety.
- The absence of a written constitution allows for flexibility. Respect for precedent can be combined with a willingness to change. From the current confusion about the status of referendums, a coherent set of constitutional practices can, and indeed will *have to*, emerge.
- The executive derives from, and is directly answerable to, the legislature thus avoiding the problems created by the separation of powers (as evidenced in the USA, where a separately elected presidency can be rendered ineffective by opposition from a hostile Congress).
- Avoidance of a presidential system reduces the scope for personality politics and demagoguery (much displayed in the current US presidential contest).
- Consultation procedures (including the use of focus groups) are commonplace at both national and local level. Public enquiries are often held before major decisions are made. Select Committees can demand evidence from both government officials and private citizens and can hold them to account.

- Modern communications technology provides the means to access a vast range of uncensored information and to communicate directly with others. The attempts by some authoritarian regimes to *block* such access and/or *insert pro-government messages*, evidences its potency.
- Despite cynical views to the contrary, most elected representatives at national and local level are probably motivated (to a large extent at least) by a desire to achieve something useful (as they see it and in the context of their own conceptual/ideological frameworks) for their fellow citizens. It is all too easy to attribute to other people motives that we would highly resent if attributed to ourselves.

Notwithstanding these 'pluses', there is a clear need to strengthen and deepen democracy in the UK, particularly in the context of a growing number of social and economic challenges at home and abroad.

Education in the UK is *failing* to promote democratic values.

43. Predominant beliefs, attitudes and customs permeate society and are bound to influence political, as much as social and economic, phenomena. If, for example, bribery and corruption are endemic in many walks of life, elections are unlikely to be free and fair. A key issue is how to promote societal changes that foster positive relations between people built upon honesty, integrity and parity of esteem. Education, in all its forms, has the potential to develop such attributes as well as to equip people to engage in *rational* and *evidence-based* argument, enabling them to distinguish what's *true* from what's *false*.³⁹ However, the education system *itself* reflects prevailing cultural attitudes and may just as easily promote an ethos that is elitist and divisive. Currently the UK appears to be moving in the direction of a more socially divided society by promoting selective and segregated education. Particularly pernicious is the defining of 'success' in terms of obtaining particular, and generally highly paid, jobs such as in the legal and financial sectors. All *useful* work, whether manual or non-manual, deserves *parity of esteem* and *fairness of reward*.⁴⁰ Also pernicious is the public funding of schools that exercise religious discrimination in their admissions policies and mix education with religious indoctrination. It is strange, for a society that supposedly wants to minimise cultural barriers and foster the democratic values of non-discrimination and equality of treatment, to promote/fund schools that say to children: "This school would provide you with a good education but you can't come here because you've got *no religion*, the *wrong religion* or the right religion but the *wrong sect* of that religion". Such discrimination can only intensify cultural conflict. Robert Dahl observes that "Democratic institutions are more likely to develop and endure in a country that is culturally fairly homogenous and less likely in a country with sharply differentiated and conflicting subcultures".

The UK needs a *coherent* and *effective* system of devolved/local government.

44. Representative democracy operates at different *spatial levels*. The UK, arguably, lacks a *coherent* set of representative structures below the national level. Scotland (population 5.3 million) has its own Parliament whilst Wales (population 3.1 million) and Northern Ireland (population 1.8 million) have their own Assemblies. Neither England (population 54.3 million) nor its regions, however, possess equivalent representative bodies. The modern system of English *local government* has undergone periodic change since it was created by statute in the late 19th century

³⁹ Article 26(2) of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace."

⁴⁰ The usefulness of some work (e.g. *gambling* through the shifting of asset ownership) is far from obvious and, indeed, potentially harmful (as evidenced by the financial crash from which the world has yet to fully recover).

and is now partly *two-tier* (27 counties with their 201 districts and Greater London with its 32 boroughs) and partly *single-tier* (36 metropolitan boroughs and 55 unitary authorities). London is currently England's only *entire conurbation* (with a population exceeding that of Scotland) presided over by a *directly elected* body (the Greater London Assembly) tasked, *inter alia*, with strategic planning (e.g. of transport and housing).⁴¹ There is a clear need for a comprehensive review of UK sub-national democratic structures (including their purpose and effectiveness), although this seems unlikely whilst the government is pre-occupied with sorting out the terms of the UK's departure from the EU. Although too big a subject to explore here, key issues are the *geographic basis* for sub-national units of government (the concept of *city regions* being floated but not fully pursued in the 1970s), the *distribution of responsibilities and powers* (particularly revenue raising and spending powers) and the degree of *autonomy of decision-making* enjoyed at each level (e.g. the extent to which higher level bodies can impose choices on lower level bodies and/or override their decisions). The general principle, arguably, should be the devolution of democratic decision-making to its lowest practicable level, bringing it as close as possible to the people it directly affects. At present a *centralising* tendency can be observed with, for example, the on-going transfer from local to central government of responsibility for school provision.⁴² Centrally-imposed cuts in the finances of local authorities, moreover, are reducing their decision-making options and in danger of restricting their role to that of central government *agencies* for the delivery of basic services/facilities (e.g. social care, road maintenance, street cleaning, refuse collection and public parks).⁴³ Unless electors are presented with a genuine choice of *alternative* local authority programmes/policies, there is no basis for democratic choice through the ballot box. This may help explain the poor turnout in most local authority elections (not as poor, albeit, as for the election of Police and Crime Commissioners).

There is no clear correlation between population size and degree of democratisation. Amongst countries of *all* sizes, there is a need to establish/strengthen democracy.

45. Relationships between the world's 7.4 billion people are profoundly affected by the geopolitical groups (nation states) into which they are divided. Nationhood, although only a social construct existing in people's heads, is a powerful determinant of human behaviour and is sustained by a variety of myths (e.g. regarding 'ancestry' and 'race'). The 165 countries examined by the *Economist* account for 99% of the world's population. Appendix 10 lists them in descending order of population. Appendix 11 tabulates them by population size and freedom/democracy status. Over a third of the world's population are citizens of just two countries, China and India,

⁴¹ The GLA (created following the 1998 referendum) resurrected, in important respects, the Greater London Council (set up in 1965 and abolished in 1986) which itself replaced the London County Council (created in 1889). The comprehensive reform of local government that took place in the 1970s included the creation of six Metropolitan County Councils for the conurbations of West Midlands, Merseyside, Greater Manchester, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire and Tyne and Wear. These, however, were abolished in 1986. A Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) was established in 2011. Its members, however, are not directly elected but comprise a nominated councillor from each of the GMCA's ten constituent metropolitan boroughs plus an interim mayor (to be replaced by a directly elected mayor in 2017).

⁴² The creation of a hotchpotch of 'academies' and 'free schools' funded and nominally controlled by *central* government is rapidly destroying a coherent system of education subject to *local* democratic accountability. The government's 'light-touch' approach to the planning and management of such schools, moreover, has facilitated the inclusion amongst their varied providers of some educational 'chancers', a few awarding themselves multiples of the prime minister's salary (courtesy of the taxpayer) for acting as 'chief executives' of school chains or ending up in court charged with the embezzlement of public funds.

⁴³ Whilst local authorities remain responsible for key aspects of environmental protection (e.g. regarding housing conditions and food standards), many now lack the staff to do the job properly. The failure to ensure that environmental legislation is *enforced* can serve only to bring the law into disrepute and cause it to be viewed with contempt.

both with populations exceeding 1 billion. A further quarter are citizens of 11 countries with populations exceeding 100 million (the largest being the United States with a population of 324 million). Most countries, however, are comparatively small. Of the 165 countries, about 75% have populations under 30 million, 50% under 10 million and 30% under 5 million. The more populous a country the more 'distant', potentially, its government from its citizens and the greater the need for robust sub-national democratic structures/processes. However, there is no clear-cut relationship between population size and degree of democratisation. Although the most populous country in the world (China) is deemed not free and authoritarian, the second, and soon to be the most, populous (India) is considered both free and democratic (albeit a 'flawed' democracy).⁴⁴ It can be seen from the final table in Appendix 11 that smaller countries are only slightly more likely to be democratic (full or flawed) than larger ones and just as likely to be authoritarian. In countries of all sizes, therefore, the challenge is to promote democracy where it is lacking/partial and deepen it where it is well established.

Democracies struggle to combine an ethical/moral foreign policy with the demands of *realpolitik*.

46. A major dilemma for established democracies is their relationship with regimes that are clearly authoritarian (including some that *claim* to be democratic by virtue of holding elections but, in practice, *rig* those elections, control the media and intimidate/incarcerate political opponents). Any qualms democratic governments might have about such relationships, however, are often overridden by economic/geopolitical concerns (thus the UK, an established democracy, has fostered a close and long-term relationship with Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy). Countries that practice democracy at home, moreover, have often been reluctant to apply it to territories they control elsewhere (as was the case with the British Empire, the few small remnants of which include some that now provide convenient tax havens). A semi-colonial relationship, arguably, still exists between the United States and Puerto Rico, whose citizens pay US taxes but have no right to vote in federal elections (a classic example of 'taxation without representation'). Democratic governments have backed/befriended, for a time at least, some of the world's worst dictators, including Saddam Hussein in the 1980s (when he was seen as providing the strong leadership needed to unite Iraq against an expansionist Iran) and Muammar Gaddafi in the early 2000s (to persuade him, in return for the lifting of oil sanctions, to stop promoting international terrorism). In the past, the United States has supported right-wing dictatorships in Central and South America, as long as they were pro-American (e.g. the Somoza family dictatorship in Nicaragua), whilst opposing governments deemed communist or socialist (e.g. those of Castro in Cuba and Allende in Chile). Democracies face the ongoing challenge of reconciling the exigencies of *realpolitik* with the desire to pursue an ethical/moral foreign policy. Some try to justify the maintenance of economic and cultural ties with authoritarian regimes on the grounds that it will encourage them to reform.

Rising nationalism and xenophobia threaten healthy relations between countries.

47. Relations between nation states depend upon the political outlook of their governments and citizens. With a democratic state, the outlook of its government should reflect broadly that of a majority of its citizens. With an authoritarian state there is more scope for divergence of outlook, although a dictatorial government may enjoy popular support. Crucial are the attitudes of national groups towards *each other*, in particular whether others are regarded as potential friends or

⁴⁴ Dahl describes India as an *improbable* democracy given the wide diversity of its population in terms of language, caste, class, religion and region but suggests that this very fragmentation (combined with a tradition in the Indian military of obedience to elected governments and the common identity that Hinduism provides for 80% of the population) might be a source of strength. "The sheer number of cultural fragments into which India is divided means that each is small, not only far short of a majority but far too small to rule over that vast and varied subcontinent."

enemies. Such attitudes will vary depending upon the content of people's 'world views' (see paragraph 2). These often incorporate national/racial myths and stereotypes but many reject such untruths and recognise instead the *common humanity* and *commonality of interest* of people throughout the world. A key problem is how people who do not share the same perspectives can relate to one another. As argued in paragraphs 3 and 35, social/institutional reality embodies *competing* world views and is in a constant state of flux. The hope is that the dialectics of discussion can shift such reality in a direction that fosters harmonious, and discourages confrontational, relations. It is worrying that many countries, including the UK, are exhibiting rising levels of nationalism and xenophobia (much evidenced in the lead up to, and in the wake of, the EU referendum) which threaten healthy relations between countries (and even between democracies). In some ways the position is potentially more dangerous than during the Cold War, at the heart of which was a deep *ideological*, but not overtly *nationalistic*, divide. Communism as a political doctrine, indeed, seeks to *break down* national barriers and *unify* the world's population (at least all those qualifying as 'workers').⁴⁵ Of course, what was *practised* in the Soviet Union, especially under the murderous dictatorship of Stalin, proved a grotesque perversion of the communist ideals that inspired the Russian Revolution. Nevertheless, a political philosophy that espouses the *comradeship* of all people in the world, regardless their of ethnicity/ancestry, is infinitely preferable to any (such as fascism, national socialism and imperialism/colonialism) that propagate racialist/nationalist myths upon the basis of which 'superior' groups (to be favoured) are distinguished from 'inferior' ones (to be subjected and exploited, if not exterminated).

Democratic control over political/bureaucratic elites is weak at a *supra-national* level.

48. Dahl identifies, as a 'dark side' of representative democracy, the fact that citizens "delegate authority not only to their elected representatives but ... to administrators, bureaucrats, civil servants, judges and, at a still further remove, to international organisations. Attached to the institutions of polyarchal democracy that help citizens to exercise influence over the conduct and decisions of their government is a non-democratic process, *bargaining among political and bureaucratic elites*." Crucial to democracy is the ability of citizens, primarily through their elected representatives, to control such elites and to set the parameters within which they operate. Like Mannheim (see paragraph 5), Dahl appears relatively sanguine about the scope for such control up to the *national* level.⁴⁶ He is less optimistic about it, however, at a *supra-national* level, stating that "internationalisation is likely to expand the domain of decisions made by political and bureaucratic elites at the expense of democratic controls" and that "from a democratic perspective the challenge posed by internationalisation is to make sure that the costs to democracy are fully taken into account when decisions shift to international levels, and to strengthen the means for holding political and bureaucratic elites accountable for their decisions".

The active participation of democracies in international organisations is nevertheless vital.

49. The challenge for democracies posed by internationalisation and globalisation is one that cannot be ducked. The pursuit of peace, security and economic stability/prosperity makes

⁴⁵ As its first national anthem, the Soviet Union adopted the *Internationale* (written after the crushing of the Paris Commune in 1871 and much sung by communists, socialists and anarchists). It includes the refrain: "So comrades, come rally / And the last fight let us face / The Internationale unites the human race."

⁴⁶ "Despite the limits on popular control, the political elites in democratic countries are not despots, out of control. Far from it. Periodic elections compel them to keep a ready eye on popular opinion. In addition, as they arrive at decisions, the political and bureaucratic elites mutually influence and check one another. Elite bargaining has its own system of mutual checks and balances. To the extent that elected representatives participate in the bargaining process, they are a channel through which popular desires, goals and values enter into governmental decisions. Political and bureaucratic elites in democratic countries are powerful, far more powerful than ordinary citizens can be; but they are not despots."

involvement at a supra-national level unavoidable. Only in co-operation with other nations can democracies hope to minimise conflict between/within countries, optimise trading relationships and regulate the *multi-national* corporations that dominate so much of the world's economic and financial activity. Such co-operation may involve *all* or *some* countries and may take different forms including defensive alliances (e.g. NATO) and a range of organisations (e.g. the UN, WTO and EU) where member states are represented and have voting rights (and perhaps the right of veto). The countries represented on some bodies (e.g. the UN) range from the most democratic to the most authoritarian. The citizens of democratic countries might exercise at least *some* influence, albeit indirectly, over how their *own* countries' representatives vote. Dahl, however, is pessimistic about the scope for this. "Even in countries where democratic institutions and practices have long existed and are well established, it is extremely difficult for citizens to exercise effective control over many key decisions on foreign affairs. It is far more difficult for them to do so in international organisations." Dahl considers that even the European Union, possessing as it does "such nominally democratic structures as popular elections and a parliament", suffers from a 'democratic deficit', key decisions being made, in practice, through bargaining among political and bureaucratic elites. The existence of a democratic deficit, however, is no reason to *abandon* membership of organisations (such as the UN or the EU) that provide the means for constructive co-operation between countries. In the case of the EU, democratic accountability could be *strengthened* within the representative framework that already exists. Membership of the EU, moreover, is restricted to European countries deemed *democratic*. Progress of the proto-fascist movements that undoubtedly exist in some member states may be checked by the ultimate sanction of *expulsion* (with all its adverse economic consequences) for any state no longer considered democratic. It is depressing that most EU quitters appear to focus exclusively upon the narrow interests of the UK, as they see them, and to lack any positive vision for the future of Europe. Some, indeed, seem to relish the prospect of other member states following the UK example, leading to the EU's eventual disintegration. They seem complacent about the possibility of returning to a system of rival European states (some with authoritarian regimes), as existed prior to the First and Second World Wars. In a speech in 1946, Churchill recognised the dangers of a politically and ideologically divided Europe. "Our constant aim must be to build and fortify the United Nations Organisation. Under and within that world concept we must re-create the European family in a regional structure called, it may be, the United States of Europe."⁴⁷

Market-capitalism can both *foster* and *harm* democracy.

50. Dahl is ambivalent about the impact of market-capitalism upon democracy. He observes that "polyarchal democracy has endured only in countries with a predominantly market-capitalist economy; and it has never endured in a country with predominantly nonmarket economy." Determining the output of personal goods and services by how people 'vote' with their money

⁴⁷ The population (over 500 million) of a United States of Europe (comprising the current 28 member states) would be larger than that of the USA and have a comparable GDP. For eurozone countries, their lack of individual currencies that can rise/fall in value to help reduce trade imbalances provides an incentive to create a European *federal* government with centralised fiscal/spending powers (as in the USA). Language diversity might be seen as a barrier to European unification but this has not proved the case with India, the world's largest democracy (see footnote 44). However, both India and the USA are the products of decolonisation/revolution. The unification of long-established independent nation states (many with equally long memories of mutual suspicion and hatred) may prove a psychological step too far. In his book *How Do We Fix This Mess?* (2012), business journalist Robert Peston states: "Although many of Europe's leaders now recognise that the salvation of the euro requires the centralisation of important powers to spend, tax, borrow and to supervise banks – in other words, the creation of something that looks a lot more like a United States of Europe – progress is desperately slow, perhaps because the people of Europe do not seem to be clamouring for the dismantling of the nation state."

(rather than by central diktat) does seem a more democratic and efficient way of allocating resources to meet consumer preferences.⁴⁸ The rise of market-capitalism has been associated with an expanding middle/skilled-working class well-placed to demand greater political representation and become actively involved in politics. The deficiencies of *unconstrained* market-capitalism (e.g. its proneness to booms and slumps, the exploitation of labour and the degradation of the environment), moreover, has required a major growth in the role of central and local government in both regulating activity and providing necessary *public* services and infrastructure. This expanded role has encouraged a demand for greater public accountability through democratic processes. It is important to emphasise, however, that people's democratic influence over government is not necessarily accompanied by democratic influence over major aspects of their *own lives* including, in particular, their *working* lives. Market-capitalism involves a tension between a minority of people who derive their living from the ownership of assets (constituting means of production) and a majority who sell their labour for wages/salaries.⁴⁹ The balance of power is tipped strongly in favour of owners and this is only partly redressed by the representation of some workers by trade unions (essentially voluntary associations organised along broadly democratic lines). It is tipping even further in their favour through the increasing use of insecure forms of employment (e.g. temporary and zero-hours contracts and *faux* 'self-employment'). The conflict between competing economic interests, and particularly the tendency of market-capitalism to produce gross inequalities in the distribution of income/wealth, represents a fundamental and growing challenge for democracy. Dahl argues that "because market-capitalism inevitably creates inequalities, it limits the democratic potential of polyarchal democracy by generating inequalities in the distribution of *political resources*" (e.g. of wealth, income, status, prestige, information, organisation, education and knowledge). He states that "market-capitalism greatly favours the development of democracy up to the level of polyarchal democracy but, because of its adverse consequences for political equality, it is unfavourable to the development of democracy beyond the level of polyarchy."

The inherent conflict between democracy and market-capitalism is turning into a crisis.

51. As long as market-capitalism achieves good rates of growth that gives the vast majority of people *increases* in both income and personal wealth, attention is diverted away from gross inequalities in their *distribution*. As soon as it fails to do so, however, a crisis looms. The combined impact of globalisation, financial mismanagement and new technology (rendering many jobs redundant) has blighted the lives of large minorities of people, many concentrated in areas of high deprivation. The Trump phenomenon can be understood only in the context of an increasing number of economically desperate individuals. The fact that many of them are looking for salvation to a more-than-once-bankrupted property-speculating narcissist shows just how desperate they must be.⁵⁰ Dahl (1998) recognises "the tension between democratic goals and a market-capitalist economy" and questions whether "there are better ways of preserving the advantage of market-capitalism while reducing its cost to political equality". In subsequent years, Dahl became increasingly pessimistic about the prospect for finding those ways and concerned about the

⁴⁸ The main problem is that some people have many more 'votes' than others, thereby directing scarce resources to the production of luxuries for the few rather than necessities for the many.

⁴⁹ This dichotomy is, of course, simplistic. Most of us, at least *indirectly*, benefit from the rewards of ownership (e.g. via pensions and insurance policies). Many people, moreover, are employees of *public* organisations. Being a public employee, however, does not guarantee fairness of treatment (as junior doctors in the NHS can testify).

⁵⁰ We have, of course, been here before. The 1930s Great Depression saw the rise in America of extreme right-wing movements that campaigned as late as 1941 for the United States to support Nazi Germany. In his *populism* but not his politics, Trump bears some resemblance to the Democrat politician Huey Long who, under the slogan 'Every Man a King', campaigned in the 1930s for a major redistribution of income/wealth and a programme of public works including the construction of highways and hospitals. Long was assassinated in Baton Rouge, Louisiana in 1935.

disproportionate control over the political process exercised by small minorities as a result of their wealth. In his last book (*On Political Equality*, 2006), he wondered whether extreme inequalities would "push some countries, including the United States, below the threshold at which we regard them as democratic".

History has not ended. Liberal democracy, if not vigorously defended, could be in retreat.

52. Francis Fukuyama's book *The End of History and the Last Man* published in 1992 argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded the end of the ideological divide between capitalism and communism and the victory of liberal democracy, which was destined to become a universal and final form of human government. Questionable even at the time, things seem much less certain a quarter of a century later. Of key concern are: the rise of petty nationalism, right-wing extremism and religious intolerance; the corruption of democratic institutions by unscrupulous individuals seeking personal wealth, power or both; the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of a small international elite over whom most people, however democratic their political institutions might be, have little or no control; the disillusionment with liberal democracy of the many people who have lost out in the changes triggered by the globalization of manufacturing, trade and financial markets and who, in their desperation, may vote for demagogues and charlatans offering 'simple' solutions.

The fight for democracy and the liberty it espouses can never end.

53. It is clear from the above that the struggle for democracy goes on and must, indeed, be *intensified*. It will be effective only if it pursues the greater democratisation of society in general, not just of political systems. This will inevitably require a much greater *equality* in the distribution of resources and decision-making powers. The struggle will be never-ending and subject to reversals. The hope is that any battles are fought and won with ideas, not weapons. This paper started with words attributed to Thomas Jefferson. It concludes with words frequently, but probably falsely, attributed to him: "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty". They were certainly used by the American abolitionist and liberal activist Wendell Phillips when speaking to an anti-slavery meeting in Massachusetts in 1852:

"Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty; power is ever stealing from the many to the few. The manna of popular liberty must be gathered each day or it is rotten. The living sap of today outgrows the dead rind of yesterday. The hand entrusted with power becomes, either from human depravity or esprit de corps, the necessary enemy of the people. Only by continued oversight can the democrat in office be prevented from hardening into a despot; only by un-intermitted agitation can a people be sufficiently awake to principle not to let liberty be smothered in material prosperity."

Roger Jennings
November 2016

Suggestions for further study:

An excellent book (quoted above and in Appendix 5) is:

Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, 2015 (2nd Edition) (1st Edition 1998), Yale University Press

Dahl, who died in 2014 at the age of 98, was Sterling Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Yale University. The 2nd edition of the book has the following description. "Written by the preeminent

democratic theorist of our time, this book explains the nature, value and mechanics of democracy. This new edition includes two additional chapters by Ian Shapiro, Dahl's successor as Sterling Professor of Political Science at Yale and a leading contemporary authority on democracy. One chapter deals with the prospect for democracy in the light of developments since the advent of the Arab Spring in 2010. The other takes up the effects of inequality and money in politics on the quality of democracy, a subject that was of increasing concern to Dahl in his final years".

A brief 'philosophical' examination of democracy can be found in Chapter 3 of:

David Miller, *Political Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, 2003

Miller, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford, uses the early 14th century painting, *The Allegory of Good and Bad Government* by Italian artist Ambrogio Lorenzetti as a peg upon which to hang discussion of a range of issues including, apart from democracy: political authority; freedom and the limits of government; justice; feminism and multiculturalism; nations, states and global justice.

Both books are exemplars of how to write engagingly and accessibly without sacrificing intellectual rigour.

For more on the Putney Debates (see Appendix 4), the following can be accessed online.

A Melvin Bragg *In Our Time* programme:

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01rw1k7>

A *Guardian* piece that includes a short video of Tony Benn arguing the importance of the Debates:

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/series/theputneydebates>

For an essay on the critical challenges faced by democracy see:

<http://www.economist.com/news/essays/21596796-democracy-was-most-successful-political-idea-20th-century-why-has-it-run-trouble-and-what-can-be-do>

Some definitions and a question:

The Concise Oxford Dictionary (10th Edition, Revised 2001) defines democracy as "a form of government in which the people have a voice in the exercise of power, typically through elected representatives". *Literal* definitions of different forms of government based on *who rules* include: democracy - the people; ochlocracy - the mob; autocracy/monarchy - one person; oligarchy - the few; aristocracy - the best; gerontocracy - the old; theocracy - priests; plutocracy - the rich; kleptocracy - thieves.

Any particular political system may display aspects of more than one of these theoretical types.

Which most characterise the UK political system?

APPENDIX 1: REFERENDUMS HELD IN THE UK AND THEIR RESULTS

- Europe: 1975 -UK to remain in or leave European Community? - Remain (67% on 65% turnout).
2016 - UK to remain in or leave European Union? - Leave (52% on 72% turnout).
- Northern Ireland: 1973 - N.I. to remain part of UK or join Irish Republic? - Remain (99% on 59% turnout).
Note: The referendum was *boycotted* by Irish Nationalists and almost all Catholics.
1998 - Adopt provisions of Good Friday Agreement? - Yes (71% on 81% turnout).
- Scotland: 1979 - Create a Scottish Assembly? - Yes (52% on 64% turnout)*
1997 - Create a Scottish Parliament? - Yes (74% on 60% turnout).
and Scottish Parliament to have tax-varying powers? - Yes (63% on 60% turnout).
2014 - Scotland to become an independent country? - No (55% on 85% turnout).
- Wales: 1979 - Create a National Assembly for Wales? - No (79% on 59% turnout).
1997 - Create a National Assembly for Wales? - Yes (50.3% on 50% turnout).
2011 - Welsh Assembly to have wider legislative powers? - Yes (64% on 36% turnout).
- London: 1998 - Create GLA with Assembly and directly elected Mayor? - Yes (72% on 34% turnout).
- Electing MPs: 2011 - Introduce an 'alternative vote' system? - No (68% on 42% turnout).

*Those in favour represented 33% of the *electorate*. In this referendum, a rule was applied that any majority in favour must comprise at least 40% of electors. Thus, although 52% of those who *voted* wanted a Scottish Assembly, the level of support was deemed inadequate to justify its creation.

APPENDIX 2: DISPROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

The table below shows how the UK's system for electing MPs (first-past-the-post in single member constituencies) generally results in the *disproportional* rather than the proportional representation of parties at Westminster.

Results of UK General Elections 1945-2015							
Year	% turnout	Conservative		Labour		Liberal/Lib Democrat	
		% votes	% seats	% votes	% seats	% votes	% seats
1945	73	40	33	48	61	9	2
1950	84	43	48	46	50	9	1
1951	83	48	51	49	47	2	1
1955	77	50	55	46	44	3	1
1959	79	50	58	46	41	3	1
1964	77	43	48	44	50	11	1
1966	76	42	40	48	58	8	2
1970	72	46	52	43	46	7	1
1974 Feb	79	38	47	37	47	19	2
1974 Oct	73	36	44	39	50	18	2
1979	76	44	53	37	42	14	2
1983	73	42	61	28	32	25	4
1987	75	42	59	31	35	23	3
1992	78	42	52	34	42	18	3
1997	71	31	25	43	64	17	7
2001	59	32	25	41	63	18	8
2005	61	32	31	35	55	23	10
2010	65	36	47	29	40	23	9
2015	66	37	51	30	36	8	1

In most years there have been substantial disparities between party shares of *votes* and of *seats*. For example, in 1983 the Conservatives' 42% of votes secured 61% of seats and in 1997 Labour's 43% of votes secured 64% of seats. In both 1951 and February 1974, moreover, the party which gained most seats and formed the government (Conservative in 1951 and Labour in February 1974) attracted fewer votes than the party which ended up in opposition.

Whilst in some years *both* of the two main parties' share of seats have exceeded their share of votes, the third party's share of seats has consistently comprised only a small fraction of its share of votes. The disparity was particularly large in 1983, when the Liberals attracted 25% of votes but won a derisory 4% of seats.

The results of the 2015 general election (see table below) provides a clear example of the distorting effect of the UK first-past-the-post system upon the representation of political parties in Parliament. Although UKIP attracted the third largest number of votes (13% of the total) it gained just *one* of the 650 seats (0.2% of the total). The share of seats gained by parties focussing on sub-nations of the UK (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), on the other hand, was generally proportionate, or more than proportionate, to their share of the vote. The SNP did particularly well, its 5% of the national vote securing 56 seats in Parliament (almost 9% of the total). By their nature, parties that target only parts of the UK are likely to benefit from the geographic concentration of their supporters. On the other hand, parties (such as UKIP, the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party) that seek support across the UK may attract many votes nationally but not enough in any one constituency to win a commensurate share of seats.

Results of UK General Election 2015					
Political Party	Votes		Seats		'Proportional Seats'*
	Number	%	Number	%	
Conservative	11,334,920	37.1	331	50.9	241
Labour	9,347,326	30.6	232	35.7	199
UKIP	3,881,129	12.7	1	0.2	83
Liberal Democrat	2,415,888	7.9	8	1.2	51
Scottish Nationalist	1,454,436	4.8	56	8.6	31
Green	1,157,613	3.8	1	0.2	25
Democratic Unionist	184,260	0.6	8	1.2	4
Plaid Cymru	181,694	0.6	3	0.5	4
Sinn Féin	176,232	0.6	4	0.6	4
Ulster Unionist	114,935	0.4	2	0.3	2
SDLP	99,809	0.3	3	0.5	2
Other	164,826	0.5	1	0.2	4
Total	30,513,068	100.0	650	100.0	650

* i.e. *If* seats were distributed between parties in proportion to their share of votes.

The final column of the table shows the number of MPs each party would have if this were determined solely by its share of the national vote. Instead of only one MP each, UKIP would have 84 and the Green Party 25. The number of Liberal Democrat MPs would increase from 8 to 51 whilst those of the SNP would reduce from 56 to 31.

Various systems of voting (see Appendix 3) have been designed to make the representation of parties more proportional to the number of votes cast for them. They generally involve the use of large multi-member constituencies (in the case of Israel's 'party list' system, the entire county being treated as a single constituency). An argument in favour of first-past-the-post systems operating in single member constituencies is that they achieve a one-to-one relationship between an MP and a particular constituency of electors. Against this, those people (possibly a majority) who voted for other candidates might not regard the MP as 'representing' them in any meaningful sense.

The most commonly used argument in favour of first-past-the-post systems makes a *virtue* of their disproportional effects. It is argued that by generally giving major parties a share of seats in excess of their share of votes they make it more likely that one party will achieve an overall majority in Parliament, promoting political stability and 'strong' government. A counter-argument is that confrontational rather than consensual politics are more likely to result and that there are plenty of examples of successful and long-lasting coalition governments. It is also unclear what degree of disproportionality of representation might be deemed acceptable. A theoretical extreme would occur where support for every party was *evenly* distributed across constituencies. One party, by attracting in each and every constituency more votes than any other single party (even though a minority of *all* votes), could scoop *100%* of the seats in Parliament.

APPENDIX 3: MAIN TYPES OF VOTING SYSTEM

Simple Plurality (SP), also known as 'First-past-the-post' (FPTP)

Single member constituencies. In each constituency, candidate who gets most votes is elected. Generally leads to over-representation of large, and under-representation of small, political parties (see Appendix 2). Used for assembly elections in many countries (including world's two largest liberal democracies, India and the USA).

Alternative Vote (AV)

Single member constituencies. Voters *number* candidates in *order of preference* (as many as they wish). First preferences are counted. Candidate receiving more than 50 per cent of these is elected. If no such candidate, one with fewest first preferences is eliminated and *second* preferences of voters who marked him/her as first preference are added to first preferences for other candidates. Process continues until candidate emerges with more than 50 per cent of first/re-allocated preferences. System avoids dilemma for some voters under simple plurality systems of whether to vote *tactically* for a 'compromise' party (e.g. in Kingston, Labour supporters might be tempted to vote Liberal Democrat as party most likely to beat Conservatives). However, system does not ensure close relationship between votes and seats (i.e. is *not* a system of proportional representation). Tends to favour compromise candidates whom few voters might *strongly* support. An AV system is used for elections to the House of Representatives in Australia.

Second Ballot (SB)

Election is held in two stages. After first ballot, candidate with fewest votes, or any candidate with less than a specified share of votes, is/are eliminated. Remaining candidates go to a second ballot (usually within a couple of weeks). People who had voted for eliminated candidate(s) can then decide for whom to vote instead. System is used for National Assembly elections in France (where candidates attracting first ballot support from least 12.5 per cent of electorate go forward to second ballot). In French presidential elections, after first ballot only top two candidates go to a run-off ballot. Effect of SB is like that of AV (i.e. tends to favour 'compromise' candidates/parties).

Party List (PL)

Multi-member regional constituencies or, as in Israel, a single national constituency. For each constituency, each political party produces a list of named candidates (in descending order of its own choice). With many PL systems, electors merely vote for a *party*. Seats are then allocated to each party in proportion to the number of votes it receives. Thus a party getting 50 per cent of votes in a constituency gets 50 per cent of seats (the required number of representatives being drawn from its list). Some PL systems allow voters to indicate a preference for a candidate as well as a party. 'Closed list' systems (e.g. as used in Israel and Spain) give no such choice. Some PL systems (e.g. as in Denmark and Sweden) have cut-off points below which a party gets no seats. By its very nature, PL achieves a close correspondence (generally from 90 to 98 percent) between party shares of votes and seats and is the main example of *proportional representation*.

Additional Member (AM)

AM is a *hybrid* system combining SP with PL. Each elector gets *two* votes, one for a candidate and one for a party. In each constituency the candidate with the most votes is elected its representative (as with SP). To these are added representatives taken from party lists in proportion to the number of votes cast for each party. Examples of the use of AM include

elections to the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, the Greater London Assembly, the German Bundestag and New Zealand's House of Representatives.

Single Transferable Vote (STV)

Multi-member constituencies (usually large but might return as few as three members). All candidates are listed on ballot paper (generally in alphabetic order). Voters number candidates in order of preference. First preference votes are counted and any candidate achieving *electoral quota* (based on so-called Droop formula) is elected. Formula is:

$((\text{all first preference votes}) \div (\text{number of seats} + 1)) + 1$

Thus in a *four* member constituency with 200,000 first preference votes, the quota would be:

$(200,000 \div 5) + 1 = 40,001$

Any candidate who meets this quota is elected. His/her 'spare' first preferences (i.e. in excess of the quota) are divided between remaining candidates *in proportion to* the second preferences shown on all the ballot papers on which the elected candidate is a first preference. Thus, in the above example, if candidate X receives 100,001 first preferences (60,000 in excess of the quota) he/she is elected. If candidate Y (yet to be elected) is second preference on 70% of X's ballot papers (i.e. on which X is the first preference) then Y is allocated 42,000 additional votes (i.e. 70% of 60,000). The process continues until enough candidates reach the quota to fill all the seats (if necessary, at some stage, eliminating the lowest scoring candidate and redistributing his/her first preference votes on the same basis).

The system achieves a close correspondence between votes cast and seats secured by each party. It clearly provides, together with PL, a system of proportional representation. However, it is complex and the extent to which voters understand its workings is questionable. Voters are confronted with a long list of candidates (if, in the above example, 5 parties put up candidates to contest all 4 seats there would be a total of 20 candidates). The crude simplicity of SP may make it more attractive to some voters despite its 'disproportional' effects.

STV systems are used for lower chamber elections in the Irish Republic, local government elections in Northern Ireland and elections to Australia's Senate. The Representation of the People Act 1918 introduced STV for multi-member University constituencies (which were abolished in 1950 under the Representation of the People Act 1948).

Limited Vote (LV)

Multi-member constituencies. Electors are allowed *fewer* votes than number of members returned. Where they are allowed only *one* vote in a two or more member constituency, the system is known as 'single non-transferable vote' or 'strictly limited vote'. As with SP, the candidates winning most votes are elected. A small party might benefit by putting up only one candidate and thus concentrating its support. However, a well-organised large party can optimise its performance by indicating to its supporters how to split their votes between its candidates. †

Used for lower chamber elections in Japan and upper house elections in Spain.

† A historic example of this is the success of the Liberal Party in Birmingham (under Joseph Chamberlain) in securing the election in 1880 of Liberal MPs to all three seats in the City's multi-member constituency. At the time an LV system was used, electors being able to cast only *two* votes in the *three*-member constituency. Under the Third Reform Act 1884-85 most multi-member constituencies (which were common in the UK) were replaced by single-member constituencies.

APPENDIX 4: THE PUTNEY DEBATES



The First English Civil War (1642-46) ended with the capture of Charles I. The leaders of the Parliamentary 'New Model Army' (notably Oliver Cromwell and Henry Ireton) supported a settlement with the king based upon relatively mild 'Heads of Proposals'. Factions within the army, some influenced by the 'Leveller' ideas of John Lilburne, proposed a stronger 'Agreement of the People'. To try to resolve the dispute, debates were held in Putney (where the army had its temporary headquarters) for 15 days starting on 28 October 1647, the opening session being held in St. Mary's Church. Some proposals were debated which went much further than those in the 'Agreement', including a call for universal male suffrage.

A key spokesman for the Levellers was Colonel Thomas Rainsborough who argued that *all* Englishmen (his radicalism did not extend to demanding equal rights for *women*) should have a say in government by involvement in the choice of the country's law-makers (i.e. MPs). This was opposed by Henry Ireton who argued that only those with a *landed* interest in the country (primarily the minority of so-called 'forty-shilling freeholders') could be trusted to exercise this right responsibly. A member of the landed gentry himself, he feared that universal male suffrage would tempt those who did not own real estate (land) to take it from those who did. Talk of a 'property-owning democracy' (much loved by Margaret Thatcher) is a hangover from the idea that anyone without a property interest is somehow a second-class citizen. Bad news, if true, for the increasing number of people forced to be tenants of private landlords (varying widely in their decency and competence). St. Mary's Church, much restored, still stands and displays an inscription commemorating Rainsborough's contribution to the Debates.

"For really I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest he; and therefore truly, sir, I think it's clear, that every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government; and I do think that the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a strict sense to that government that he hath not had a voice to put himself under..."

... every man born in England cannot, ought not, neither by the Law of God nor the Law of Nature, to be exempted from the choice of those who are to make laws for him to live under, and for him, for aught I know, to lose his life under."

Thomas Rainsborough
Colonel in the New Model Army



"No person hath a right to an interest or share in the disposing of the affairs of the kingdom, and in determining or choosing those that shall determine what laws we shall be ruled by here – no person hath a right to this, that hath not a permanent fixed interest in this kingdom..."

... I do not mean that I would have it restrained to that proportion that now obtains, but to restrain it still to men who have ... such an interest that they may live upon it as freemen, and who have such an interest as is fixed upon a place... If a man be an inhabitant upon a rack rent for a year, for two years, or twenty years, you cannot think that man hath any fixed or permanent interest...

... if you admit any man that hath a breath and being ... It may come to destroy property thus. You may have such men chosen, or at least the major part of them, as have no local and permanent interest. Why may not those men vote against all property? ... Those that have interest in the land may be voted out of their land. It may destroy property that way."

Henry Ireton
General in the Parliamentary Army and Oliver Cromwell's son-in-law



APPENDIX 5: DAHL'S REQUIREMENTS FOR MODERN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

See: Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, 2015 (2nd Edition) (1st Edition 1998), Yale University Press

"Briefly, the political institutions of modern representative democratic government are:

1. *Elected officials*. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in officials elected by citizens. Thus modern large-scale democratic governments are *representative*.
2. *Free, fair and frequent elections*. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
3. *Freedom of expression*. Citizens have a right to express themselves without danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order and the prevailing ideology.
4. *Access to alternative sources of information*. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative and independent sources of information from other citizens, experts, newspapers, magazines, books, telecommunications and the like. Moreover, alternatives sources of information actually exist that are not under the control of the government or any other single political group attempting to influence public political beliefs and attitudes, and these alternative sources are effectively protected by law.
5. *Associational autonomy*. To achieve their various rights, including those required for the effective operation of democratic political institutions, citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or organisations, including independent political parties and interest groups.
6. *Inclusive citizenship*. No adult permanently residing in the country and subject to its laws can be denied the rights that are available to others and are necessary to the five political institutions just listed. These include the right to vote in the election of officials in free and fair elections; to run for elective office; to form and participate in independent political organisations; to have access to independent sources of information; and rights to other liberties and opportunities that may be necessary to the effective operation of political institutions of large-scale democracy."

Dahl argues that the stability of democracies depends upon the existence of underlying favourable conditions and cannot be guaranteed by any particular constitutional arrangements (although these may help where conditions are 'mixed'). Constitutional arrangements vary between democracies depending upon a wide range of historical, geographical, social and economic factors. Dahl distinguishes five possible options for democratic constitutions based upon type of electoral system and whether the executive emerges from, or is elected separately from, the legislature.

1. *The continental European option*: parliamentary government with PR elections.
2. *The British (or Westminster) option*: parliamentary government with FPTP elections.
3. *The US option*: presidential government with FPTP elections.
4. *The Latin American option*: presidential government with PR elections.
5. *The mixed option*: other combinations.

Examples of mixed options include France (which has a separately elected president wielding considerable power in addition to a prime minister answerable to parliament and which uses an SB electoral system) and Germany (which has a federal constitution with AM elections). Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands have used 'consociational' systems (with political decisions requiring *consensus* approval) in order to reconcile the different interests of distinct population groups (related, for example, to language, religion and culture). The Northern Ireland power-sharing arrangement can be seen as a type of consociational system.

APPENDIX 6: QUESTIONS USED BY *FREEDOM HOUSE* AND *ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT*

FREEDOM HOUSE QUESTIONS

POLITICAL RIGHTS

A. Electoral Process

1. Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?
2. Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair?

B. Political Pluralism and Participation

1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?
2. Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?
4. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and electoral opportunities?

C. Functioning of Government

1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?
2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption?
3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency?

ADDITIONAL DISCRETIONARY POLITICAL RIGHTS QUESTIONS

1. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, encourage public discussion of policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler?
2. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favour of another group?

CIVIL LIBERTIES

D. Freedom of Expression and Belief

1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: In cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey gives the system credit.)
2. Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and express themselves in public and private?
3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination?
4. Is there open and free private discussion?

E. Associational and Organisational Rights

1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?
2. Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations? (Note: This includes civic organizations, interest groups, foundations, etc.)
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?

F. Rule of Law

1. Is there an independent judiciary?
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control?
3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?
4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?

G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights

1. Do citizens enjoy freedom of travel or choice of residence, employment, or institution of higher education?
2. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, political parties/organizations, or organized crime?
3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?
4. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?

ECONOMIST QUESTIONS

I Electoral process and pluralism

1. Are elections for the national legislature and head of government free? Consider whether elections are competitive in that electors are free to vote and are offered a range of choices.
1: Essentially unrestricted conditions for the presentation of candidates (for example, no bans on major parties)
0.5: There are some restrictions on the electoral process
0: A single-party system or major impediments exist (for example, bans on a major party or candidate)
2. Are elections for the national legislature and head of government fair?
1: No major irregularities in the voting process
0.5: Significant irregularities occur (intimidation, fraud), but do not affect significantly the overall outcome
0: Major irregularities occur and affect the outcome
Score 0 if score for question 1 is 0.
3. Are municipal elections both free and fair?
1: Are free and fair 0.5: Are free but not fair 0: Are neither free nor fair
4. Is there universal suffrage for all adults? Bar generally accepted exclusions (for example, non-nationals; criminals; members of armed forces in some countries).
1: Yes 0: No
5. Can citizens cast their vote free of significant threats to their security from state or non-state bodies?
1: Yes 0: No
6. Do laws provide for broadly equal campaigning opportunities?
1: Yes 0.5: Yes formally, but in practice opportunities are limited for some candidates 0: No
7. Is the process of financing political parties transparent and generally accepted?
1: Yes 0.5: Not fully transparent 0: No
8. Following elections, are the constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another clear, established and accepted?
1: All three criteria are fulfilled
0.5: Two of the three criteria are fulfilled
0: Only one or none of the criteria is satisfied
9. Are citizens free to form political parties that are independent of the government?
1: Yes 0.5: There are some restrictions 0: No
10. Do opposition parties have a realistic prospect of achieving government?
1: Yes
0.5: There is a dominant two party system in which other political forces never have any effective chance of taking part in national government
0: No
11. Is potential access to public office open to all citizens?
1: Yes
0.5: Formally unrestricted, but in practice restricted for some groups, or for citizens from some parts of the country
0: No
12. Are citizens free to form political and civic organisations, free of state interference and surveillance?
1: Yes
0.5: Officially free, but subject to some restrictions or interference
0: No

II Functioning of government

- 13.** Do freely elected representatives determine government policy?
1: Yes 0.5: Exercise some meaningful influence 0: No
- 14.** Is the legislature the supreme political body, with a clear supremacy over other branches of government?
1: Yes 0: No
- 15.** Is there an effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority?
1: Yes 0.5: Yes, but there are some serious flaws 0: No
- 16.** Government is free of undue influence by the military or the security services.
1: Yes
0.5: Influence is low, but the defence minister is not a civilian. If the current risk of a military coup is extremely low, but the country has a recent history of military rule or coups
0: No
- 17.** Foreign powers do not determine important government functions or policies.
1: Yes
0.5: Some features of a protectorate
0: No (significant presence of foreign troops; important decisions taken by foreign power; country is a protectorate)
- 18.** Special economic, religious or other powerful domestic groups do not exercise significant political power, parallel to democratic institutions?
1: Yes 0.5: Exercise some meaningful influence 0: No
- 19.** Are sufficient mechanisms and institutions in place for assuring government accountability to the electorate in between elections?
1: Yes 0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist 0: No
- 20.** Does the government's authority extend over the full territory of the country?
1: Yes 0: No
- 21.** Is the functioning of government open and transparent, with sufficient public access to information?
1: Yes 0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist 0: No
- 22.** How pervasive is corruption?
1: Corruption is not a major problem
0.5: Corruption is a significant issue
0: Pervasive corruption exists
- 23.** Is the civil service willing and capable of implementing government policy?
1: Yes 0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist 0: No
- 24.** Popular perceptions of the extent to which they have free choice and control over their lives.
1: High 0.5: Moderate 0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey % of people who think that they have a great deal of choice/control
1 if more than 70% 0.5 if 50-70% 0 if less than 50%
- 25.** Public confidence in government.
1: High 0.5: Moderate 0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey % of people who have a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in government
1 if more than 40% 0.5 if 25-40% 0 if less than 25%
- 26.** Public confidence in political parties.
1: High 0.5: Moderate 0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey % of people who have a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence
1 if more than 40% 0.5 if 25-40% 0 if less than 25%

III Political participation

- 27.** Voter participation/turnout for national elections. (average turnout in parliamentary and/or presidential elections since 2000. Turnout as proportion of population of voting age).
1 if consistently above 70% 0.5 if between 50% and 70% 0 if below 50%
If voting is obligatory, score 0. Score 0 if scores for questions 1 or 2 is 0.
- 28.** Do ethnic, religious and other minorities have a reasonable degree of autonomy and voice in the political process?
1: Yes 0.5: Yes, but serious flaws exist 0: No

- 29. Women in parliament.** % of members of parliament who are women.
1 if more than 20% of seats 0.5 if 10-20% 0 if less than 10%
- 30. Extent of political participation.** Membership of political parties and political non-governmental organisations.
1 if over 7% of population for either 0.5 if 4% to 7% 0 if under 4%.
If participation is forced, score 0.
- 31. Citizens' engagement with politics.**
1: High 0.5: Moderate 0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey % of people who are very or somewhat interested in politics
1 if over 60% 0.5 if 40% to 60% 0 if less than 40%
- 32. The preparedness of population to take part in lawful demonstrations.**
1: High 0.5: Moderate 0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey % of people who have taken part in or would consider attending lawful demonstrations
1 if over 40% 0.5 if 30% to 40% 0 if less than 30%
- 33. Adult literacy.**
1 if over 90% 0.5 if 70% to 90% 0 if less than 70%
- 34. Extent to which adult population shows an interest in and follows politics in the news.**
1: High 0.5: Moderate 0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey % of population that follows politics in the news media (print, TV or radio) every day
1 if over 50% 0.5 if 30% to 50% 0 if less than 30%
- 35. The authorities make a serious effort to promote political participation.**
1: Yes 0.5: Some attempts 0: No
Consider the role of the education system, and other promotional efforts. Consider measures to facilitate voting by members of the Diaspora. If participation is forced, score 0.
- IV Democratic political culture**
- 36. Is there a sufficient degree of societal consensus and cohesion to underpin a stable, functioning democracy?**
1: Yes 0.5: Yes, but some serious doubts and risks 0: No
- 37. Perceptions of leadership; proportion of the population that desires a strong leader who bypasses parliament and elections.**
1: Low 0.5: Moderate 0: High
If available, from World Values Survey % of people who think it would be good or fairly good to have a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections
1 if less than 30% 0.5 if 30% to 50% 0 if more than 50%
- 38. Perceptions of military rule; proportion of the population that would prefer military.**
1: Low 0.5: Moderate 0: High
If available, from World Values Survey % of people who think it would be very or fairly good to have army rule
1 if less than 10% 0.5 if 10% to 30% 0 if more than 30%
- 39. Perceptions of rule by experts or technocratic government; proportion of the population that would prefer rule by experts or technocrats.**
1: Low 0.5: Moderate 0: High
If available, from World Values Survey % of people who think it would be very or fairly good to have experts, not government, make decisions for the country
1 if less than 50% 0.5 if 50% to 70% 0 if more than 70%
- 40. Perception of democracy and public order; proportion of the population that believes that democracies are not good at maintaining public order.**
1: Low 0.5: Moderate 0: High
If available, from World Values Survey % of people who disagree with the view that democracies are not good at maintaining order
1 if more than 70% 0.5 if 50% to 70% 0 if less than 50%

- 41.** Perception of democracy and the economic system; proportion of the population that believes that democracy benefits economic performance.
If available, from World Values Survey % of people who disagree with the view that the economic system runs badly in democracies
1 if more than 80% 0.5 if 60% to 80% 0 if less than 60%
- 42.** Degree of popular support for democracy.
1: High 0.5: Moderate 0: Low
If available, from World Values Survey % of people who agree or strongly agree that democracy is better than any other form of government.
1 if more than 90% 0.5 if 75% to 90% 0 if less than 75%
- 43.** There is a strong tradition of the separation of church and state.
1: Yes 0.5: Some residual influence of church on state 0: No

V Civil liberties

- 44.** Is there a free electronic media?
1: Yes
0.5: Pluralistic, but state-controlled media are heavily favoured. One or two private owners dominate the media
0: No
- 45.** Is there a free print media?
1: Yes
0.5: Pluralistic, but state-controlled media are heavily favoured. There is high degree of concentration of private ownership of national newspapers
0: No
- 46.** Is there freedom of expression and protest (bar only generally accepted restrictions such as banning advocacy of violence)?
1: Yes
0.5: Minority viewpoints are subject to some official harassment. Libel laws restrict heavily scope for free expression
0: No
- 47.** Is media coverage robust? Is there open and free discussion of public issues, with a reasonable diversity of opinions?
1: Yes
0.5: There is formal freedom, but high degree of conformity of opinion, including through self-censorship, or discouragement of minority or marginal views
0: No
- 48.** Are there political restrictions on access to the internet?
1: No 0.5: Some moderate restrictions 0: Yes
- 49.** Are citizens free to form professional organisations and trade unions?
1: Yes 0.5: Officially free, but subject to some restrictions 0: No
- 50.** Do institutions provide citizens with the opportunity to successfully petition government to redress grievances?
1: Yes 0.5: Some opportunities 0: No
- 51.** The use of torture by the state.
1: Torture is not used 0: Torture is used
- 52.** The degree to which the judiciary is independent of government influence. Consider the views of international legal and judicial watchdogs. Have the courts ever issued an important judgment against the government, or a senior government official?
1: High 0.5: Moderate 0: Low
- 53.** The degree of religious tolerance and freedom of religious expression. Are all religions permitted to operate freely, or are some restricted? Is the right to worship permitted both publicly and privately? Do some religious groups feel intimidated by others, even if the law requires equality and protection?
1: High 0.5: Moderate 0: Low
- 54.** The degree to which citizens are treated equally under the law. Consider whether favoured members of groups are spared prosecution under the law.
1: High 0.5: Moderate 0: Low

- 55. Do citizens enjoy basic security?**
 1: Yes
 0.5: Crime is so pervasive as to endanger security for large segments
 0: No
- 56. Extent to which private property rights protected and private business is free from undue government influence.**
 1: High 0.5: Moderate 0: Low
- 57. Extent to which citizens enjoy personal freedoms. Consider gender equality, right to travel, choice of work and study.**
 1: High 0.5: Moderate 0: Low
- 58. Popular perceptions on human rights protection; proportion of the population that think that basic human rights are well-protected.**
 1: High 0.5: Moderate 0: Low
 If available, from World Values Survey % of people who think that human rights are respected in their country
 1 if more than 70% 0.5 if 50% to 70% 0 if less than 50%
- 59. There is no significant discrimination on the basis of people's race, colour or creed.**
 1: Yes 0.5: Yes, but some significant exceptions 0: No
- 60. Extent to which the government invokes new risks and threats as an excuse for curbing civil liberties.**
 1: Low 0.5: Moderate 0: High

APPENDIX 7: FREEDOM HOUSE NATIONAL RANKINGS 2015 (from 2016 Report)

R - Rank; S - Score (out of 100); PR - Political Rights; CL - Civil Liberties

* electoral democracies (for PR and CL: 1 = best and 7 = worst)

R	Country	S	PR	CL	R	Country	S	PR	CL	R	Country	S	PR	CL
1	Finland*	100	1	1	56	India*	77	2	3	111	Pakistan*	41	4	5
1	Iceland*	100	1	1	56	Namibia*	77	2	2	112	Guinea	40	5	5
1	Norway*	100	1	1	56	Suriname*	77	2	3	113	Guinea-Bissau	39	5	5
1	Sweden*	100	1	1	59	Jamaica*	75	2	3	114	Kyrgyzstan	38	5	5
5	Canada*	99	1	1	60	Guyana*	74	2	3	115	Jordan	36	6	5
5	Netherlands*	99	1	1	61	Botswana*	73	3	2	115	Kuwait	36	5	5
7	Australia*	98	1	1	62	Peru*	71	2	3	115	Uganda	36	6	5
7	Denmark*	98	1	1	63	Dominican Rep.*	70	3	3	118	Algeria	35	6	5
7	Luxembourg*	98	1	1	63	Montenegro*	70	3	3	118	Venezuela	35	5	5
7	New Zealand*	98	1	1	65	El Salvador*	69	2	3	120	Gabon	34	6	5
7	Uruguay*	98	1	1	66	Bolivia*	68	3	3	121	Cambodia	32	6	5
12	Portugal*	97	1	1	67	Albania*	67	3	3	121	Thailand	32	6	5
13	Belgium*	96	1	1	67	Lesotho*	67	3	3	121	Zimbabwe	32	5	5
13	Ireland*	96	1	1	69	Indonesia*	65	2	4	124	Mauritania	30	6	5
13	Japan*	96	1	1	69	Mexico*	65	3	3	124	Tanzania*	30	3	4
13	Malta*	96	1	1	69	Philippines*	65	3	3	126	Djibouti	28	6	5
13	Switzerland*	96	1	1	69	Sierra Leone*	65	3	3	126	Myanmar	28	6	5
18	Austria*	95	1	1	69	Timor-Leste*	65	3	3	126	Rep. Congo	28	6	5
18	Chile*	95	1	1	74	Georgia*	64	3	3	129	Egypt	27	6	5
18	Czech Republic*	95	1	1	74	Malawi*	64	3	3	129	Iraq	27	5	6
18	Germany*	95	1	1	74	Paraguay*	64	3	3	129	Qatar	27	6	5
18	Spain*	95	1	1	77	Columbia*	63	3	4	132	Dem. Rep. Congo	25	6	6
18	United Kingdom*	95	1	1	78	Fiji*	62	3	3	132	Oman	25	6	5
24	Cyprus*	94	1	1	79	Liberia*	61	3	4	134	Afghanistan	24	6	6
24	Estonia*	94	1	1	79	Ukraine*	61	3	3	134	Angola	24	6	6
26	Poland*	93	1	1	81	Moldova*	60	3	3	134	Cameroon	24	6	6
27	Slovenia*	92	1	1	81	Zambia*	60	3	4	134	Kazakhstan	24	6	5
28	France*	91	1	1	83	Burkina Faso	59	4	3	134	Rwanda	24	6	6
28	Lithuania*	91	1	1	83	Ecuador*	59	3	3	139	Russia	22	6	6
30	Cape Verde*	90	1	1	83	Papua. N. Guinea*	59	4	3	140	Chad	20	7	6
30	Costa Rica*	90	1	1	86	Bosnia & H.*	57	4	3	140	Libya	20	6	6
30	Mauritius*	90	1	2	86	Macedonia	57	4	3	140	U. A. Emirates	20	6	6
30	United States*	90	1	1	88	Bhutan*	56	3	4	140	Vietnam	20	7	5
34	Italy*	89	1	1	88	Madagascar*	56	3	4	144	Burundi	19	7	6
34	Slovakia*	89	1	1	88	Mozambique	56	4	4	145	Gambia	18	7	6
34	Taiwan*	89	1	2	91	Comoros*	55	2	4	145	Swaziland	18	7	5
37	Croatia*	87	1	2	91	Sri Lanka*	55	4	4	147	Belarus	17	7	6
38	Latvia*	86	2	2	93	Guatemala*	54	4	4	147	Iran	17	6	6
38	Mongolia*	86	1	2	93	Nicaragua	54	4	3	147	Yemen	17	7	6
40	Ghana*	83	1	2	95	Turkey*	53	3	4	150	Azerbaijan	16	7	6
40	Greece*	83	2	2	96	Niger*	52	3	4	150	China	16	7	6
40	Panama*	83	2	2	97	Ivory Coast*	51	4	4	150	Cuba	16	7	6
40	Romania*	83	2	2	97	Kenya*	51	4	4	150	Tajikistan	16	7	6
40	South Korea*	83	2	2	97	Nepal*	51	3	4	154	Ethiopia	15	7	6
45	Benin*	82	2	2	97	Singapore	51	4	4	155	Bahrain	14	7	6
46	Brazil*	81	2	2	101	Bangladesh*	49	4	4	156	Laos	12	7	6
46	Trin. & Tobago*	81	2	2	102	Nigeria*	48	4	5	157	Saudi Arabia	10	7	7
48	Bulgaria*	80	2	2	102	Togo	48	4	4	158	Eq. Guinea	8	7	7
48	Israel*	80	1	2	104	Armenia	46	5	4	159	Cent. Afr. Rep.	7	7	7
50	Argentina*	79	2	2	105	Haiti	45	5	5	160	Sudan	6	7	7
50	Hungary*	79	2	2	105	Honduras	45	4	4	161	Turkmenistan	4	7	7
52	South Africa*	79	2	2	105	Malaysia	45	4	4	162	Eritrea	3	7	7
52	Tunisia*	79	1	3	105	Mali	45	5	4	162	North Korea	3	7	7
54	Senegal*	78	2	2	109	Lebanon	43	5	4	162	Uzbekistan	3	7	7
54	Serbia*	78	2	2	110	Morocco	41	5	4	165	Syria	-1	7	7

Free

Partly Free

Not Free

APPENDIX 8: ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT'S INDEX OF DEMOCRACY 2015

Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score
1	Norway	9.93	56	Suriname	6.77	111	Cambodia	4.27
2	Iceland	9.58	57	Tunisia	6.72	112	Myanmar	4.14
3	Sweden	9.45	58	Serbia	6.71	113	Iraq	4.08
4	New Zealand	9.26	59	Romania	6.68	114	Armenia	4.00
5	Denmark	9.11	60	Dom. Republic	6.67	115	Mauritania	3.96
6	Switzerland	9.09	61	El Salvador	6.64	116	Algeria	3.95
7	Canada	9.08	62	Mongolia	6.62	117	Haiti	3.94
8	Finland	9.03	62	Columbia	6.62	118	Jordan	3.86
9	Australia	9.01	64	Lesotho	6.59	119	Kuwait	3.85
10	Netherlands	8.92	65	Peru	6.58	119	Niger	3.85
11	Luxembourg	8.88	66	Mexico	6.55	121	Ethiopia	3.83
12	Ireland	8.85	67	Malaysia	6.43	122	Gabon	3.76
13	Germany	8.64	68	Sri Lanka	6.42	123	Comoros	3.71
14	Austria	8.54	69	Moldova	6.35	124	Cameroon	3.66
15	Malta	8.39	70	Paraguay	6.33	125	Belarus	3.62
16	United Kingdom	8.31	71	Namibia	6.31	126	Vietnam	3.53
17	Spain	8.30	72	Zambia	6.28	127	Cuba	3.52
18	Mauritius	8.28	73	Singapore	6.14	128	Togo	3.41
19	Uruguay	8.17	74	Senegal	6.08	129	Angola	3.35
20	United States	8.05	75	Guyana	6.05	130	Ivory Coast	3.31
21	Italy	7.98	76	Pap. New Guinea	6.03	130	Russia	3.31
22	South Korea	7.97	77	Macedonia	6.02	132	Egypt	3.18
23	Japan	7.96	78	Montenegro	6.01	132	Qatar	3.18
23	Costa Rica	7.96	79	Guatemala	5.92	134	Guinea	3.14
25	Czech Republic	7.94	80	Albania	5.91	134	China	3.14
26	Belgium	7.93	81	Georgia	5.88	136	Swaziland	3.09
27	France	7.92	82	Ecuador	5.87	137	Rwanda	3.07
28	Botswana	7.87	83	Honduras	5.84	138	Kazakhstan	3.06
29	Estonia	7.85	84	Bolivia	5.75	139	Zimbabwe	3.05
30	Chile	7.84	85	Bangladesh	5.73	140	Oman	3.04
31	Taiwan	7.83	86	Benin	5.72	141	Gambia	2.97
32	Cape Verde	7.81	87	Ukraine	5.70	142	Rep. of Congo	2.91
33	Portugal	7.79	87	Mali	5.70	143	Djibouti	2.90
34	Israel	7.77	89	Fiji	5.69	144	Bahrain	2.79
35	India	7.74	90	Tanzania	5.58	145	Afghanistan	2.77
36	Slovenia	7.57	91	Malawi	5.55	146	U. A. Emirates	2.75
37	South Africa	7.56	92	Kyrgyzstan	5.33	147	Azerbaijan	2.71
38	Lithuania	7.54	92	Kenya	5.33	148	Burundi	2.49
39	Cyprus	7.53	94	Nicaragua	5.26	149	Sudan	2.37
40	Greece	7.45	95	Uganda	5.22	149	Eritrea	2.37
41	Jamaica	7.39	96	Turkey	5.12	151	Libya	2.25
42	Latvia	7.37	97	Thailand	5.09	152	Yemen	2.24
43	Slovakia	7.29	98	Venezuela	5.00	153	Laos	2.21
44	Timor-Leste	7.24	99	Liberia	4.95	154	Iran	2.16
45	Panama	7.19	100	Bhutan	4.93	155	D. Rep. of Congo	2.11
46	Bulgaria	7.14	101	Lebanon	4.86	156	Uzbekistan	1.95
47	Trinidad & Tobago	7.10	102	Madagascar	4.85	156	Tajikistan	1.95
48	Poland	7.09	103	Bosnia & H.	4.83	158	Guinea-Bissau	1.93
49	Indonesia	7.03	104	Nepal	4.77	158	Saudi Arabia	1.93
50	Argentina	7.02	105	Burkina Faso	4.70	160	Turkmenistan	1.83
51	Brazil	6.96	106	Morocco	4.66	161	Eq. Guinea	1.77
52	Croatia	6.93	107	Nigeria	4.62	162	Central Afr. Rep.	1.57
53	Ghana	6.86	108	Mozambique	4.60	163	Chad	1.50
54	Philippines	6.84	109	Sierra Leone	4.55	164	Syria	1.43
54	Hungary	6.84	110	Pakistan	4.40	165	North Korea	1.08

 Full (8 - 10)

 Flawed (6 - 7.9)

 Hybrid (4 - 5.9)

 Authoritarian (below 4)

APPENDIX 9: COMPARISON OF FREEDOM HOUSE AND ECONOMIST SCORES/RANKINGS 2015

Country	F. House		Economist		Country	F. House		Economist		Country	F. House		Economist	
	S	R	S	R		S	R	S	R		S	R	S	R
Afghanistan	24	=134	2.77	145	Ghana	83	=40	6.86	53	North Korea	3	=162	1.08	165
Albania	67	=67	5.91	80	Greece	83	=40	7.45	40	Norway	100	=1	9.93	1
Algeria	35	=118	3.95	116	Guatemala	54	=93	5.92	79	Oman	25	=132	3.04	140
Angola	24	=134	3.35	129	Guinea	40	112	3.14	=134	Pakistan	41	=110	4.40	110
Argentina	79	=50	7.02	50	Guinea-Bissau	39	113	1.93	=158	Panama	83	=40	7.19	45
Armenia	46	104	4.00	114	Guyana	74	60	6.05	75	Pap. N. Guinea	59	=83	6.03	76
Australia	98	=7	9.01	9	Haiti	45	=105	3.94	117	Paraguay	64	=74	6.33	70
Austria	95	=18	8.54	14	Honduras	45	=105	5.84	83	Peru	71	62	6.58	65
Azerbaijan	16	=150	2.71	147	Hungary	79	=50	6.84	=54	Philippines	65	=69	6.84	=54
Bahrain	14	155	2.79	144	Iceland	100	=1	9.58	2	Poland	93	26	7.09	48
Bangladesh	49	101	5.73	85	India	77	=56	7.74	35	Portugal	97	12	7.79	33
Belarus	17	=147	3.62	125	Indonesia	65	=69	7.03	49	Qatar	27	=129	3.18	=132
Belgium	96	=13	7.93	26	Iran	17	=147	2.16	154	Rep. of Congo	28	=126	2.91	142
Benin	82	45	5.72	86	Iraq	27	=129	4.08	113	Romania	83	=40	6.68	59
Bhutan	56	=88	4.93	100	Ireland	96	=13	8.85	12	Russia	22	139	3.31	=130
Bolivia	68	66	5.75	84	Israel	80	=48	7.77	34	Rwanda	24	=134	3.07	137
Bosnia & H.	57	=86	4.83	103	Italy	89	=34	7.98	21	Saudi Arabia	10	157	1.93	=158
Botswana	73	61	7.87	28	Ivory Coast	51	=97	3.31	=130	Senegal	78	=50	6.08	74
Brazil	81	=46	6.96	51	Jamaica	75	59	7.39	41	Serbia	78	=50	6.71	58
Bulgaria	80	=48	7.14	46	Japan	96	=13	7.96	=23	Sierra Leone	65	=69	4.55	109
Burkina Faso	59	83	4.70	105	Jordan	36	=115	3.86	118	Singapore	51	=97	6.14	73
Burundi	19	144	2.49	148	Kazakhstan	24	=134	3.06	138	Slovakia	89	=34	7.29	43
Cambodia	32	=121	4.27	111	Kenya	51	=97	5.33	=92	Slovenia	92	27	7.57	36
Cameroon	24	=134	3.66	124	Kuwait	36	=115	3.85	=119	South Africa	79	=50	7.56	37
Canada	99	=5	9.08	7	Kyrgyzstan	38	114	5.33	92=	South Korea	83	=40	7.97	22
Cape Verde	90	=30	7.81	32	Laos	12	156	2.21	153	Spain	95	=18	8.30	17
Cent. Afr. Rep.	7	159	1.57	162	Latvia	86	=38	7.37	42	Sri Lanka	55	=91	6.42	68
Chad	20	=140	1.50	163	Lebanon	43	109	4.86	101	Sudan	6	160	2.37	=149
Chile	95	=18	7.84	30	Lesotho	67	=67	6.59	64	Suriname	77	=56	6.77	56
China	16	=150	3.14	=134	Liberia	61	=79	4.95	99	Swaziland	18	=145	3.09	136
Columbia	63	77	6.62	=62	Libya	20	=140	2.25	151	Sweden	100	=1	9.45	3
Comoros	55	=91	3.71	123	Lithuania	91	=28	7.54	38	Switzerland	96	=13	9.09	6
Costa Rica	90	=30	7.96	=23	Luxembourg	98	=7	8.88	11	Syria	-1	165	1.43	164
Croatia	87	37	6.93	52	Macedonia	57	=86	6.02	77	Taiwan	89	=34	7.83	31
Cuba	16	=150	3.52	127	Madagascar	56	=88	4.85	102	Tajikistan	16	=150	1.95	=156
Cyprus	94	=24	7.53	39	Malawi	64	=74	5.55	91	Tanzania	30	=124	5.58	90
Czech Republic	95	=18	7.94	25	Malaysia	45	=105	6.43	67	Thailand	32	=121	5.09	97
D. Rep. Congo	25	=132	2.11	155	Mali	45	=105	5.70	=87	Timor-Leste	65	=69	7.24	44
Denmark	98	=7	9.11	5	Malta	96	=13	8.39	15	Togo	48	=102	3.41	128
Djibouti	28	=126	2.90	143	Mauritania	30	=124	3.96	115	Trin. & Tobago	81	=46	7.10	47
Dominican Rep.	70	=63	6.67	60	Mauritius	90	=30	8.28	18	Tunisia	79	=50	6.72	57
Ecuador	59	=83	5.87	82	Mexico	65	=69	6.55	66	Turkey	53	95	5.12	96
Egypt	27	=129	3.18	=132	Moldova	60	=81	6.35	69	Turkmenistan	4	161	1.83	160
El Salvador	69	65	6.64	61	Mongolia	86	=38	6.62	=62	U. A. Emirates	20	=140	2.75	146
Eq. Guinea	8	158	1.77	161	Montenegro	70	=63	6.01	78	Uganda	36	=115	5.22	95
Eritrea	3	=162	2.37	=149	Morocco	41	=110	4.66	106	Ukraine	61	=79	5.70	=87
Estonia	94	=24	7.85	29	Mozambique	56	=88	4.60	108	United Kingdom	95	=18	8.31	16
Ethiopia	15	154	3.83	121	Myanmar	28	=126	4.14	112	United States	90	=30	8.05	20
Fiji	62	78	5.69	89	Namibia	77	=56	6.31	71	Uruguay	98	=7	8.17	19
Finland	100	=1	9.03	8	Nepal	51	=97	4.77	104	Uzbekistan	3	=162	1.95	=156
France	91	=28	7.92	27	Netherlands	99	=5	8.92	10	Venezuela	35	=118	5.00	98
Gabon	34	120	3.76	122	New Zealand	98	=7	9.26	4	Vietnam	20	=140	3.53	126
Gambia	18	145	2.97	141	Nicaragua	54	=93	5.26	94	Yemen	17	=147	2.24	152
Georgia	64	74	5.88	81	Niger	52	96	3.85	=119	Zambia	60	=81	6.28	72
Germany	95	18	8.64	13	Nigeria	48	=102	4.62	107	Zimbabwe	32	=121	3.05	139

Appendix 10: Freedom & Democracy Status of Countries in Descending Order of 2016 Population (UN Estimates)

Country	Pop (m)	Free?	Dem?	Country	Pop (m)	Free?	Dem?	Country	Pop (m)	Free?	Dem?
China	1,382.3	Unfree	Auth	Ivory Coast*	23.3	Partly	Auth	Finland*	5.5	Free	Full
India*	1,326.8	Free	Flawed	Sri Lanka*	20.8	Partly	Flawed	Eritrea	5.4	Unfree	Auth
United States*	324.1	Free	Full	Niger*	20.7	Partly	Auth	Turkmenistan	5.4	Unfree	Auth
Indonesia*	260.6	Partly	Flawed	Romania*	19.4	Free	Flawed	Slovakia*	5.4	Free	Flawed
Brazil*	209.6	Free	Flawed	Syria	18.6	Unfree	Auth	Norway*	5.3	Free	Full
Pakistan*	192.8	Partly	Hybrid	Burkina Faso	18.6	Partly	Hybrid	Central Afr. Rep.	5.0	Unfree	Auth
Nigeria*	187.0	Partly	Hybrid	Chile*	18.1	Free	Flawed	Costa Rica*	4.9	Free	Flawed
Bangladesh*	162.9	Partly	Hybrid	Mali	18.1	Partly	Hybrid	Oman	4.7	Unfree	Auth
Russia	143.4	Unfree	Auth	Kazakhstan	17.9	Unfree	Auth	Rep. of Congo	4.7	Unfree	Auth
Mexico*	128.6	Partly	Flawed	Malawi*	17.7	Partly	Hybrid	Ireland*	4.7	Free	Full
Japan*	126.3	Free	Flawed	Netherlands*	17.0	Free	Full	New Zealand*	4.6	Free	Full
Philippines*	102.3	Partly	Flawed	Zambia*	16.7	Partly	Flawed	Liberia*	4.6	Unfree	Hybrid
Ethiopia	101.9	Unfree	Auth	Guatemala*	16.7	Partly	Hybrid	Mauritania	4.2	Unfree	Auth
Vietnam	94.4	Unfree	Auth	Ecuador*	16.4	Partly	Hybrid	Croatia*	4.2	Free	Flawed
Egypt	93.4	Unfree	Auth	Zimbabwe	16.0	Partly	Auth	Moldova*	4.1	Partly	Flawed
Germany*	80.7	Free	Full	Cambodia	15.8	Unfree	Hybrid	Kuwait	4.0	Partly	Auth
Iran	80.0	Unfree	Auth	Senegal*	15.6	Free	Flawed	Panama*	4.0	Free	Flawed
D. Rep. of Congo	79.7	Unfree	Auth	Chad	14.5	Unfree	Auth	Georgia*	4.0	Partly	Hybrid
Turkey*	79.6	Partly	Hybrid	Guinea	12.9	Partly	Auth	Bosnia & H.*	3.8	Free	Hybrid
Thailand	68.1	Unfree	Hybrid	Rwanda	11.9	Unfree	Auth	Uruguay*	3.4	Free	Full
United Kingdom*	65.1	Free	Full	Burundi	11.6	Unfree	Auth	Mongolia*	3.0	Free	Flawed
France*	64.7	Free	Flawed	Cuba	11.4	Unfree	Auth	Armenia	3.0	Partly	Hybrid
Italy*	59.8	Free	Flawed	Belgium*	11.4	Free	Flawed	Lithuania*	2.9	Free	Flawed
Tanzania*	55.2	Partly	Hybrid	Benin*	11.2	Free	Hybrid	Albania*	2.9	Partly	Hybrid
South Africa*	55.0	Free	Flawed	Greece*	10.9	Free	Flawed	Jamaica*	2.8	Free	Flawed
Myanmar	54.4	Unfree	Hybrid	Bolivia*	10.9	Partly	Hybrid	Namibia*	2.5	Free	Flawed
South Korea*	50.5	Free	Flawed	Haiti	10.8	Partly	Auth	Qatar	2.3	Unfree	Auth
Columbia*	48.7	Partly	Flawed	Dominican Rep.*	10.6	Partly	Flawed	Botswana*	2.3	Free	Flawed
Kenya*	47.3	Partly	Hybrid	Czech Republic*	10.5	Free	Flawed	Lesotho*	2.2	Partly	Flawed
Spain*	46.1	Free	Full	Portugal*	10.3	Free	Flawed	Gambia	2.1	Unfree	Auth
Ukraine*	44.6	Partly	Hybrid	Azerbaijan	9.9	Unfree	Auth	Slovenia*	2.1	Free	Flawed
Argentina*	43.8	Free	Flawed	Sweden*	9.9	Free	Full	Macedonia	2.1	Partly	Flawed
Sudan	41.2	Unfree	Auth	Hungary*	9.8	Free	Flawed	Latvia*	2.0	Free	Flawed
Algeria	40.4	Unfree	Auth	Belarus	9.5	Unfree	Hybrid	Guinea-Bissau	1.9	Partly	Auth
Uganda	40.3	Unfree	Hybrid	U. Arab Emirates	9.3	Unfree	Auth	Gabon	1.8	Unfree	Auth
Poland*	38.6	Free	Flawed	Serbia*	8.8	Free	Flawed	Bahrain	1.4	Unfree	Auth
Iraq	37.5	Unfree	Hybrid	Tajikistan	8.7	Unfree	Auth	Trin.& Tobago*	1.4	Free	Flawed
Canada*	36.3	Free	Full	Austria*	8.6	Free	Full	Tunisia*	1.4	Free	Flawed
Morocco	34.8	Partly	Hybrid	Switzerland*	8.4	Free	Full	Swaziland	1.3	Unfree	Auth
Afghanistan	33.4	Unfree	Auth	Israel*	8.2	Free	Flawed	Estonia*	1.3	Free	Flawed
Saudi Arabia	32.2	Unfree	Auth	Honduras	8.2	Partly	Hybrid	Mauritius*	1.3	Free	Full
Peru*	31.8	Partly	Flawed	Pap. N. Guinea*	7.8	Partly	Flawed	Cyprus*	1.2	Free	Flawed
Venezuela	31.5	Partly	Hybrid	Jordan	7.7	Unfree	Auth	Timor-Leste*	1.2	Partly	Flawed
Malaysia	30.8	Partly	Flawed	Togo	7.5	Partly	Auth	Djibouti	0.9	Unfree	Auth
Uzbekistan	30.3	Unfree	Auth	Bulgaria*	7.1	Free	Flawed	Eq. Guinea	0.9	Unfree	Auth
Nepal*	28.9	Partly	Hybrid	Laos	6.9	Unfree	Auth	Fiji*	0.9	Partly	Hybrid
Mozambique	28.8	Partly	Hybrid	Paraguay*	6.7	Partly	Flawed	Comoros*	0.8	Partly	Auth
Ghana*	28.0	Free	Flawed	Sierra Leone*	6.6	Partly	Hybrid	Guyana*	0.8	Free	Flawed
Yemen	27.5	Unfree	Auth	Libya	6.3	Unfree	Auth	Bhutan*	0.8	Partly	Hybrid
Angola	25.8	Unfree	Auth	Nicaragua	6.2	Partly	Hybrid	Montenegro*	0.6	Partly	Flawed
North Korea	25.3	Unfree	Auth	El Salvador*	6.1	Free	Flawed	Luxembourg*	0.6	Free	Full
Madagascar*	24.9	Partly	Hybrid	Kyrgyzstan	6.0	Partly	Hybrid	Cape Verde*	0.5	Free	Flawed
Australia*	24.3	Free	Full	Lebanon	6.0	Partly	Hybrid	Suriname*	0.5	Free	Flawed
Cameroon	23.9	Unfree	Auth	Singapore	5.7	Partly	Flawed	Malta*	0.4	Free	Full
Taiwan*	23.4	Free	Flawed	Denmark*	5.7	Free	Full	Iceland*	0.3	Free	Full

* electoral democracies as defined by *Freedom House*

Appendix 11: Characteristics of the 165 countries covered by the *Economist* Index

Freedom Status	Countries		Population	
	Number	%	Millions	%
Free	62	37.6	2,873	39.0
Partly Free	56	33.9	1,841	25.0
Not Free	47	28.5	2,660	36.1
Total	165	100.0	7,374	100.0

Democracy Status	Countries		Population	
	Number	%	Millions	%
Full	20	12.1	652	8.8
Flawed	58	35.2	2,887	39.2
Hybrid	37	22.4	1,307	17.7
Authoritarian	50	30.3	2,528	34.3
Total	165	100.0	7,374	100.0

Pop. of country (millions)	Countries		Population	
	Number	%	Millions	%
> 1,000	2	1.2	2,709	36.7
250-329	2	1.2	585	7.9
150-249	4	2.4	752	10.2
100-149	5	3.0	602	8.2
70-99	6	3.6	508	6.9
50-69	8	4.8	473	6.4
40-49	8	4.8	352	4.8
30-39	10	6.1	337	4.6
20-29	13	7.9	326	4.4
10-19	27	16.4	392	5.3
5-9	31	18.8	224	3.0
< 5	49	29.7	114	1.5
Total	165	100.0	7,374	100.0

Population (millions)	Democracy Status of Country									
	Full		Flawed		Hybrid		Authoritarian		All	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
100+	1	7.7	6	46.2	3	23.1	3	23.1	13	100.0
50-99	2	14.3	4	28.6	4	28.6	4	28.6	14	100.0
30-49	2	11.1	5	27.8	6	33.3	5	27.8	18	100.0
20-29	1	7.7	3	23.1	3	23.1	6	46.2	13	100.0
10-19	1	3.7	9	33.3	8	29.6	9	33.3	27	100.0
5-9	6	19.4	9	29.0	6	19.4	10	32.3	31	100.0
< 5	7	14.3	22	44.9	7	14.3	13	26.5	49	100.0
All	20	12.1	58	35.2	37	22.4	50	30.3	165	100.0